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Recent industry innovations improving the safety of the Nation’s meat supply range
from new pathogen tests, high-tech equipment, and supply chain management systems,
to new surveillance networks. Despite these and other improvements, the market incen-
tives that motivate private firms to invest in innovation seem to be fairly weak. Results
from an ERS survey of U.S. meat and poultry slaughter and processing plants and two
case studies of innovation in the U.S. beef industry reveal that the industry has devel-
oped a number of mechanisms to overcome that weakness and to stimulate investment in
food safety innovation. Industry experience suggests that government policy can increase
food safety innovation by reducing informational asymmetries and strengthening the
ability of innovating firms to appropriate the benefits of their investments. 
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Recent industry innovations improving the safety of the Nation’s meat supply
range from new pathogen tests, high-tech equipment, and supply chain manage-
ment systems, to new surveillance networks. Despite these and other improve-
ments, the market incentives that motivate private firms to invest in innovation
seem to be fairly weak. Results from an ERS survey of U.S. meat and poultry
slaughter and processing plants and two case studies of innovation in the U.S. beef
industry reveal that the industry has developed a number of mechanisms to over-
come that weakness and to stimulate investment in food safety innovation. 
Large restaurant chains have created a market for food safety. By far the
dominant drivers of food safety innovation in the meat industry are the strin-
gent requirements on product safety and quality demanded by large fast food
restaurants. By demanding safer products from their suppliers, these restau-
rants have successfully created markets for food safety. The success of these
markets rests on the ability of these large buyers of meat to enforce standards
through testing and process audits—and to reward suppliers who meet safety
standards. Through contracts with these large buyers, meat processors are able
to appropriate the benefits of their investments in food safety.
Branding helps firms appropriate benefits from food safety innovation.
Branding also plays an important role in helping firms appropriate the bene-
fits of safety investments. The major, name-brand fast food restaurants are
able to appropriate some of the benefits of their investments in food safety
because of their reputations for safe food. However, name-brand recognition
is a double-edged sword: it allows consumers (and regulators) to identify and
reward firms that produce high-quality, safe products, but it also increases
their chances of identifying firms that are guilty of safety lapses. Branding
reduces the chances of remaining anonymous in case of a foodborne outbreak,
thereby further strengthening the incentives to invest in food safety.
International trade stimulates demand for safety and provides technological
spillovers. International trade has played an important role in stimulating the
demand for food safety, much the same way as large fast food restaurants. By
demanding high safety standards in testing product for safety, and then paying
premiums or guaranteeing sales for safe producers, foreign buyers fuel the
growth of markets for food safety and stimulate safety innovation.
First movers appropriate the benefits of innovation and encourage diffusion.
The first company to adopt a new technology can often appropriate the benefits
of innovation. The Texas American Foodservice Corporation (Texas American),
for example, did not patent its newly developed Bacterial Pathogen Sampling
and Testing Program or seek any other sort of protection for the innovation. Its
first mover advantage was sufficient to forestall pressure from competitors and to
allow it to appropriate the benefits of the innovation. Not only did Texas
American not seek protection for the innovation, it actually sought to dissemi-
nate the technology, arguing that anything that helps reduce the possibility of
outbreaks associated with hamburgers is good for business. Another reason that
firms may have an interest in sharing new technologies with their competitors
and with government regulators is to influence the standard of care for the
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to entry that benefits the first adopters.
Collaboration facilitates innovation and dissemination. The observation that
the performance of the industry as a whole affects the reputation and prof-
itability of all firms in the industry provides incentives for firms to collaborate
to improve overall industry performance. In the two case studies presented
here, the innovative process was dependent on collaboration. In each case, the
technical and managerial expertise of the collaborators combined to facilitate
the development of the innovation and ensure that it would be effective in a
commercial setting. In addition to technical and managerial benefits, collabo-
ration also provides important risk-sharing benefits.
Market conditions push large firms to innovate. The ERS survey indicates
that large slaughter plants had much higher food safety technology ratings
than smaller ones, suggesting that economies of scale, i.e., lower per unit
costs for large plants over small ones, plays a major role in whether plants
adopt capital-intensive food safety technologies. However, economies of scale
do not sufficiently explain all differences. Two characteristics peculiar to the
beef industry and food safety also play a role. First, large and small slaughter
plants face different markets. Large plants tend to supply large, homogeneous
markets with relatively elastic demand, while smaller plants tend to serve
smaller markets with less elastic demand. To protect their markets, large
plants may have more incentive than small firms to adopt food safety innova-
tions. Another reason large firms may invest more in food safety than small
firms do is that lapses in food safety have the potential to be more costly for
large firms because they may involve larger amounts of product.
Foodborne disease outbreaks spur the demand for safety and innovation.
The 1993 outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 was a seminal food safety event in the
United States. This outbreak led to increased consumer awareness of food
safety issues and triggered a spike in demand for food safety that is still being
felt in the industry. For many consumers, news about foodborne illness
outbreaks is their only information about food safety. As a result, the market
is susceptible to large fluctuations after foodborne illness outbreaks, as
consumers reassess their buying decisions.
Technological validation by third parties is as important as technological
opportunity in driving innovation. The Steam Pasteurization System case study
highlights an important observation about technological innovation for food
safety: the design and fabrication of the technology may be secondary to techno-
logical validation in determining the ultimate success of an innovation. Not only
is it difficult to measure pathogen control and technological efficacy, but even the
best technology can be undermined by deficiencies in the overall safety system.
The actual efficacy of the technology may vary greatly from plant to plant,
depending on the characteristics of each plant’s safety system. As a result,
innovators may have a difficult time certifying or otherwise guaranteeing the
efficacy of the technology for controlling pathogen contamination.
The drivers of food safety innovation highlighted by the ERS survey and the case
studies suggest four areas where government policy may be well targeted for stim-
ulating food safety innovation:
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Safety Innovation in the United States / AER-831 ● v● Strengthening appropriability (the ability to control and exploit the benefits from innovation)
through safety information,
● Strengthening appropriability through increasing the costs of food safety failure and the benefits
of success,
● Providing flexibility in the choice of food safety technology, and 
● Investing in the scientific infrastructure and supporting research on safety testing.
In general, government policy targeted at overcoming asymmetric information
problems in markets for food safety will go a long way toward establishing incen-
tives for efficient investment in food safety innovation.
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HD9416 Introduction
The last decade marked a period of extensive innovation
in the science and regulation of food safety in the
United States. New production technologies, supply
management systems, detection methodologies, regula-
tory approaches, and surveillance networks are improv-
ing the safety of the Nation’s food supply. Improved
food safety is in turn lowering the incidence of food-
borne illness in the United States. Data from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention show a 23-percent
overall decline in bacterial foodborne illness in the
United States from 1996 to 2001 (CDC, 2002). 
Despite this progress, bacterial contamination and large
recalls are still making news. Unprecedented recalls of
hamburger patties in 2002 because of pathogen contam-
ination indicate that control programs have yet to be
reliably successful. Can producers do more to efficiently
control pathogen contamination? What motivates pro-
ducers to invest in food safety innovation? How can
policymakers and regulators best target policy to
increase efficient food safety investment? 
The drive for food safety innovation has come from a
number of sources. The food industry, consumers, and
lawmakers have all played a part in stimulating the
development and adoption of food safety innovations. In
some cases, lawmakers or consumer organizations have
prodded industry into making improvements to food
safety. In other cases, food manufacturers have pio-
neered new methodologies to improve the safety of their
products, often producing foods that exceed government
safety requirements. When industry successfully inno-
vates to produce safe foods, a win-win situation arises,
with the innovating firm, consumers, and government
all benefiting from improved food safety.
In this report, we investigate the factors that motivate
firms to invest in food safety innovation and identify
government policies supporting such motivation. We
begin with an overview of the economic literature on
innovation in which we examine the core drivers of
innovation in the economy. We then conduct a theoreti-
cal analysis of the strength of these core drivers for
motivating investments in food safety innovation. We
hypothesize that the core drivers of innovation are rela-
tively weak for food safety. We test this hypothesis with
evidence from a recent survey of U.S. meat and poultry
slaughter and processing plants and two case studies of
food safety innovation. We find that industry has devel-
oped a number of mechanisms for overcoming weak-
nesses in the food safety incentive structure and for
stimulating food safety innovation. We build on industry
experience to suggest government policies that may best
support food safety compliance and innovation. 
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Food Safety Innovation 
in the United States
Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence 
from the Meat Industry
Elise Golan, Tanya Roberts, Elisabete Salay, Julie Caswell, 
Michael Ollinger, and Danna MooreFood Safety Innovation 
Boosts Social Welfare
Innovation is all the scientific, technological, organiza-
tional, financial, and commercial activities necessary
to create, implement, and market new or improved
products or processes (OECD, 1997). Innovation takes
two forms: product innovation and process innovation. 
A product innovation is the development and commer-
cialization of a product with improved performance
characteristics (OECD, 1997). Product innovation
tends to expand consumer choice. More product
choice allows more consumers to find products that
better match their particular tastes and preferences,
thereby expanding consumer welfare. This welfare-
increasing effect of product innovation is not guaran-
teed, however. Product innovations that become the
industry or regulatory standard may ultimately reduce,
not increase, product differentiation and consumer
welfare. For example, some cities prohibit sales of
unpasteurized milk, thereby reducing choice through
the elimination of raw milk markets. 
A process innovation is the development or adoption
of a new or significantly improved production or deliv-
ery method (OECD, 1997). Process innovations may
be technological or organizational, involving changes
in equipment, human resources, working methods or
any combination of these. Process innovation tends to
make production more efficient. With diffusion, some
or all of these efficiency gains may be passed on to
consumers in the form of lower prices. Social welfare
is improved through lower prices and more efficient
use of resources. 
The distinction between product and process innova-
tion for food safety is not clear cut because food safety
process innovations often lead to safer foods, not just
the same level of safety at less cost. Pasteurized milk,
juices, and eggs, ultra-high temperature (UHT) milk,
and irradiated spices and meat patties encompass tech-
nological innovations that have made standard food
products safer. Even such processing changes as prop-
erly refrigerated trucks, lot coding, lay-date stamping
on eggs, pathogen testing, and instant-read thermome-
ters all lead to safer final products, blurring the line
between process and product innovation. 
Imitation plays an important role in ensuring that the
benefits of innovation, whether product or process, are
maximized. Imitators, those firms that adopt and adapt
innovations pioneered by other firms, help ensure that
the choice and efficiency gains of innovation are real-
ized. Product innovations that are widely marketed have
a bigger impact on consumer choice than those with
limited market exposure. Process innovations that are
widely adopted or account for a large share of industry
output have a larger impact on industry efficiency and
consumer welfare than those with limited use. 
Widespread diffusion of food safety innovation not
only increases choice and economic efficiency, it also
saves lives and improves health. In 1999, the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimated
that annually, one in three Americans become ill from
a foodborne illness, one in 700 are hospitalized, and
one in 60,000 die (Mead et al., 1999). The human toll
is mirrored by an economic one. USDA’s Economic
Research Service estimates that the annual economic
cost of five foodborne illnesses1 is approximately $6.9
billion per year (ERS, 2001). Innovation and the adop-
tion and diffusion of food safety improvements will
help combat foodborne illness and improve the quality
of life for all Americans. 
Appropriability, Market Demand, and
Technological Opportunity Are Key to
Innovation
How can policymakers and regulators encourage food
safety innovation to improve public health and expand
social welfare? Why do some policies succeed in stim-
ulating food safety innovation for some firms but not
for others? To begin to answer these questions, we first
turn to the general economics literature. Economists
and business analysts have spent well over half a cen-
tury investigating the questions of “What drives firms
to innovate?” and “What differentiates innovating from
non-innovating firms?”
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1 The five pathogens included in the ERS estimate are
Campylobacter, Salmonella (nontyphoidal serotypes only), E. coli
O157:H7 and non-O157 STEC, and Listeria monocytogenes.
Part I. Theory: The Economics of Food Safety Innovation A starting point for much research on innovating
behavior is Schumpeter’s work on growth and innova-
tion (Schumpeter, 1934 and 1942). His assertion that
large firms operating in concentrated markets are the
best engines of technological progress motivated early
innovation researchers to focus their investigations on
the role of firm size and market concentration. Only
relatively recently have researchers expanded the
investigation to examine other factors, eventually iden-
tifying appropriability (the ability to control and
exploit the benefits from innovation), market demand,
and technological opportunity as the core drivers for
innovation and technological change. In this section,
we outline how these core drivers of innovation oper-
ate in most industries and then examine their operation
in the food industry for food safety innovation. For
more complete reviews of the innovation literature, see
Freeman (1994), Cohen (1995), and Stoneman (1995).
Pray and Fuglie (2000) examine the literature on the
drivers of innovation in agriculture. 
Appropriability
Appropriability, the ability to control and exploit the
benefits from innovation, plays a key role in driving
investment in innovation. Only if firms expect to be
able to reap the benefits of an innovation will they
have an incentive to innovate. This principle was artic-
ulated by Schumpeter when he argued that the expec-
tation of ex-post market power is an important
inducement to innovation (Schumpeter, 1942). 
Early researchers, including Schumpeter, argued that
bigger, diversified, oligopolistic firms are typically in a
better position to appropriate the benefits of innovation
than smaller, specialized, firms without market power.
This is more likely to be the case when the most effi-
cient mechanism for appropriating the benefits of
innovation is through a firm’s own output. However,
when other means of appropriation are as effective,
then size, degree of diversification, and ex-ante market
power are joined by other firm and industry character-
istics in predicting a firm’s potential for appropriating
the benefits of innovation—and therefore, for predict-
ing which firms will invest in innovation. 
Supply chain management, patents, branding, market-
ing, customer service, secrecy, early sale of innovative
rights, and first-mover advantage all provide varying
degrees of protection from competition and help firms
appropriate the benefits of innovation. Firms that suc-
cessfully develop any of these appropriation mecha-
nisms will be better able to capture benefits from inno-
vation, and therefore have more incentive to innovate,
than firms that are unable to create these mechanisms.
Firms may use any of these mechanisms. In their sur-
vey of American firms (the first comprehensive survey
of appropriability conditions in the U.S. manufacturing
sector), Levin et al. (1987) found that 80 percent of
surveyed firms regarded investments in complemen-
tary sales and services as an effective means to protect
returns to innovative investments. Many of the firms in
the Levin et al. survey stated that a head start and the
ability to move quickly down the learning curve were
more effective means of appropriation than patents.
Peculiarities of the industry, firm, and even the type of
innovation interact to determine the most efficient
means of appropriation and the firms that are most
successful in establishing them.
The importance of appropriability in motivating inno-
vative activity extends to every manager and worker in
the firm or plant. Managers and workers who are able
to appropriate some of the benefits of innovative activ-
ity will be more likely to initiate and engage in such
activity. Subtle firm-level characteristics such as the
organization of product development, information pro-
cessing capabilities, and internal organization may
have a strong effect on the appropriation structure
within the firm and the incentives of individual work-
ers to engage in innovative activity. This observation
echoes one made by Schumpeter in his discussion of
the delusory effect of hierarchical management sys-
tems on managerial initiative. He argued that managers
who do not have some control over the product of their
labor will lose the incentive to innovate. 
Demand 
The view that market demand has an almost exclusive
pull on innovation was staked out by Schmookler in his
work on the determinants of technical change
(Schmookler, 1962 and 1966). He argued that demand
determines the rate and direction of inventive activity
because rational, profit-seeking firms are responsive to
economic incentives. Schmookler argued that there is a
general pool of knowledge and technical capability, and
that only those industries driven by market demand are
motivated to dip into the pool and adapt technologies to
their own purpose. Market demand provides the incen-
tive to firms to innovate and adapt technologies. 
To test Schmookler’s hypothesis, researchers have pri-
marily examined intermediate products, demand for
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the downstream production technology. Though
Schmookler’s own empirical investigation found that
demand played a major role in driving innovation
(Schmookler, 1966), subsequent researchers have not
duplicated this result. In general, the empirical evi-
dence has not identified demand to be a key determi-
nant of innovation (Cohen, 1995). 
Though demand may not directly spur innovation,
researchers have suggested two principal ways in
which demand conditions may influence innovative
activity. First, the size of the market may influence
innovation because even if innovative activity is scale
neutral, the benefits of innovation are proportional to
the size of the market. In other words, holding con-
stant the cost of innovation, more innovative activity
would be expected in the larger market or in the mar-
ket expected to grow more rapidly. 
Second, the elasticity of demand may also play a role
in determining the level of innovation. Kaimen and
Schwartz (1970) demonstrated that the gains from
process innovation are larger when demand is more
elastic. Process innovation lowers production costs,
thereby shifting out the supply curve. Movements of
the supply curve result in larger quantity changes and
smaller price changes, the more elastic the demand. As
a result, process innovation triggers larger increases in
producer surplus when demand is more elastic. The
effect of demand elasticity on the gains from product
innovation is less straightforward. Market structure
and the degree to which consumers view the new and
old products as substitutes determine gains from prod-
uct innovation more than do existing demand elastici-
ties. (For an introduction to this literature, see Carlton
and Perloff, 1994.)
Technological Opportunity
Contrary to Schmookler’s position, the “technology-
pull” hypothesis posits that the direction and rate of
technological change is determined not by demand, but
by the suitability of the technology to a particular indus-
trial application. In general, the empirical evidence
tends to support this hypothesis, finding that cost and
applicability of design are as important as, or more
important than, demand considerations (Cohen, 1995). 
The existence or growth of scientific knowledge
encourages innovation through a number of avenues.
First, the cost of undertaking a science-based innova-
tion may decrease as scientific knowledge increases. A
strong scientific base focuses innovative activities in
the most productive direction, reducing the costs of
trial and error. Second, a strong scientific base may
provide a rich pool of potential technologies, thereby
increasing the likelihood of finding a technology effi-
ciently suited to a firm’s or industry’s specific objec-
tives. Third, a strong scientific base may actually
increase a firm’s or industry’s set of objectives,
decreasing innovation costs by expanding the set of
problems with solutions. 
The development of technologies is often completely
divorced from demand considerations—though applica-
tions triggered by initial technological breakthroughs are
often motivated by demand conditions. In many cases, a
major innovation triggers a series of smaller innovations
tailored to the specific needs of a particular firm or
industry (Walsh, 1984). For example, the scientific
research behind the harnessing of electron beams, x-
rays, or gamma rays was not motivated by the demand
for pathogen control in food processing. However,
demand for food safety has motivated the application of
irradiation technologies for controlling pathogens and
improving the safety of a variety of foods. Irradiation
technologies have been developed to control pathogens
and fungi in spices and dried vegetable seasonings, to
delay ripening and sprouting in fresh fruits and vegeta-
bles, and to control pathogens and extend shelf-life of
raw meats and meat products (ERS, 2003). 
Changes in Appropriability, Demand, and
Technological Opportunity Vary the Costs
and Benefits of Innovation and Imitation  
As outlined above, the theoretical and empirical eco-
nomics literature points to appropriability, market
demand, and technological opportunity as the key fac-
tors affecting the costs and benefits of innovation. The
strength of these factors helps to tip the balance
toward innovation for some firms and away from inno-
vation for others. Strong appropriability mechanisms,
large potential markets, elastic demand, and innova-
tions that are easily adaptable to firm-specific applica-
tions all increase the benefits of innovation, tipping the
innovation cost-benefit calculus toward innovation.
Table A-1 illustrates how these three factors condition
a firm’s innovation cost-benefit calculus. 
Appropriability, market demand, and technological
opportunity also play key roles in a firm’s decision to
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else in the industry). These three factors influence the
costs and benefits of imitation—though not always in
the same direction as they influence innovation.
Column 3 in table A-1 illustrates how these three fac-
tors stimulate or dampen a firm’s incentive to imitate. 
When innovating firms have strong appropriability
mechanisms, the cost of imitation rises, tipping the cost-
benefit calculus away from imitation. For example, the
cost of imitation is higher when an innovation is
patented. Mansfield et al. (1982) found that of 48 firms
interviewed, the median estimate of the increase in the
cost of imitation due to patents was 11 percent on aver-
age. In their survey of American manufacturers, Levin et
al. (1987) found that the relative cost of duplicating an
innovation was higher for patented than for unpatented
process and product innovations. Any innovation appro-
priability mechanisms that make it more costly for imita-
tors will dampen the extent of imitation. 
Potentially large markets and demand elasticities have
the same influence on imitation as they have on inno-
vation. Imitators will reap more benefits from invest-
ments to duplicate process innovations in large
markets with elastic demand. 
Technology spillovers from innovating firms reduce
the amount of resources imitating firms must spend
on R&D activities. Technologies that are easily adapt-
able to firm-specific characteristics reduce the cost of
imitation. Innovative spillovers increase the speed of
the diffusion of innovation and increase consumer
welfare. Spence (1984) dubs this the efficiency effects
of spillovers.
The dynamics of the firm’s innovation and imitation
incentives reflect constantly changing information
regarding the costs and benefits of innovation and
imitation—and the extent of appropriability, techno-
logical opportunity, and market demand. Firms are
constantly adjusting to new information and updating
their innovation and imitation strategies. The simple
cost-benefit seesaw described in table A-1 is influ-
enced by a stream of new information that can tip the
balance without any actual change in the underlying
cost-benefit structure. 
Market Failure Distorts the 
Incentives for Food Safety 
Innovation and Imitation 
Though there is no reason to suspect that technological
opportunity has been exhausted for food safety innova-
tion, appropriability and market demand seem relatively
difficult to establish for food safety. As a result, the
incentives for food safety innovation are less than in
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Table A-1—Economic literature suggests three main drivers of innovation and imitation
Innovation Imitation
Appropriability + The stronger the ability of innovators to  - The stronger the ability of innovators to 
appropriate the benefits of innovation, the  appropriate the benefits of innovation, the 
higher the likelihood of innovation  lower the likelihood of imitation
+ The stronger the ability to appropriate the 
benefits of imitation, the higher the likelihood 
of imitation
+ The higher the likelihood that firms will  + The higher the likelihood that firms will be 
be forced to bear costs of food safety failure, forced to bear costs of food safety failure,
the higher the likelihood of innovation the higher the likelihood of imitation
Size and shape of demand
Size + The larger the market, the stronger the incentive  + The larger the market, the stronger the 
to innovate incentive to imitate
Elastic demand + The more elastic the demand, the stronger  + The more elastic the demand, the stronger 
the incentive to invest in process innovations  the incentive to invest in process imitation
Technological opportunity + The greater the technological opportunity, + The greater the technological opportunity,
the lower the cost of innovation and the greater  the lower the cost of imitation and the greater 
the incentive to innovate the incentive to imitateindustries with large markets and effective mechanisms
for appropriating the benefits of innovation. However,
weak appropriability may hasten the diffusion of inno-
vation, thus amplifying the consumer benefits of any
innovation that does take place. In this section, we
examine the logic behind these observations. 
Information Asymmetries Erode the
Appropriability of Food Safety Innovation 
It may be difficult for producers to appropriate the
benefits of food safety innovation because improved
food safety is a difficult attribute for consumers to
detect. For the most part, food safety is a credence
attribute. Credence attributes are those that consumers
cannot evaluate even when they use or consume the
product (Darby and Karni, 1973). Consumers cannot
usually determine before purchase, or even after con-
sumption, whether a food was produced with the best
or worst safety procedures, or whether a food poses a
health risk. For example, consumers are unable to dis-
tinguish between raw ground beef contaminated with
E. coli O157:H7 and uncontaminated ground beef. 
Because consumers cannot detect food safety, they
may be unwilling to pay a premium for “safer” food.
Consumers may worry about fraud and the possibility
that some foods marketed as safer products are actu-
ally standard or even sub-standard products. In fact,
firms producing low-safety foods may have an incen-
tive to market their products as high-safety; they could
charge high-safety prices, and because of their cost
cutting, have greater profits than high-safety produc-
ers. If this incentive were left unchecked, the market
would be dominated by low-quality products with little
or no product differentiation (Akerlof, 1970). In this
case, consumers would be correct in assuming that all
products were of low quality unless proved otherwise. 
In some cases, food producers themselves may be
unaware of the safety characteristics of individual
products. For example, poultry producers do not typi-
cally have information on whether a specific package
of chicken thighs is contaminated with Salmonella.
Producers do know, however, what safety procedures
are maintained in their plants and whether their proce-
dures surpass, meet, or fall below industry standards.
As a result, although producers do not have complete
information, they have more information than con-
sumers about product safety. Firms with poor safety
records may try to take advantage of the fact that con-
sumers lack full information about firms’ safety
records and market their products as if they had been
produced with the best safety technologies. 
Producers have developed a number of approaches for
overcoming problems associated with marketing cre-
dence attributes and for assuring consumers that attrib-
utes such as safety actually exist (for a review of this
literature, see Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell, 2000). For
food safety and quality, one of the most common
approaches is to establish a brand name associated
with high standards. Connor and Schiek note the
advantages of this strategy (1997, p. 348):
In consumers’minds the brand names identify
the main attributes of the product and are a
guarantee of consistent or minimum quality.
Brands are preferred by consumers to unbranded
products because they reduce the uncertainties
concerning product performance, quality, and
value associated with food purchases. 
Third-party quality verification is another approach
used by firms to overcome consumer skepticism
regarding credence quality attributes. Third-party enti-
ties offer a wide variety of inspection services to verify
that a firm’s production standards or quality content
are as advertised. Third-party certifiers inspect trace-
ability systems to verify the existence of credence
process attributes such as organic, fair trade, dolphin-
safe, no child labor, and earth-friendly. Third-party
certifiers also inspect production facilities and book-
keeping records to verify that firms have adhered to
safety standards. Some third-party certifiers provide
testing services to verify that pathogen contamination
or other safety problems are under control. 
A growing number of food manufacturers are insisting
on third-party safety certification from their suppliers.
Traceability documentation, lab results, and detailed
safety inspections are becoming increasingly important
in contracts among food processors (Golan et al.,
2003). To date, most consumers do not demand this
type of information from food suppliers, and firms do
not typically supply this information to their con-
sumers. Since this information exists, particularly for
high-quality firms, it is puzzling that producers do not
use it to advertise their good safety records and appro-
priate more of the benefits of their safety investments.
One reason may be that in advertising their good
safety records, and disclosing the poorer safety records
of their competitors, firms also disclose general food
facts that may frighten consumers. Consumers may not
react positively to claims like “our Salmonella count is
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decide that though such advertising could differentiate
them from poorer quality producers, any overt mention
of safety risks could work to their disadvantage and to
the disadvantage of the industry as a whole. 
In addition, firms may want to avoid specific safety
guarantees that could expose them to additional liabil-
ity. Food safety is not easy to guarantee, particularly in
the case of pathogen contamination. Even the most
careful producer could experience a safety problem.
Deviations from planned procedures, uncertainty
regarding input contamination, equipment malfunc-
tion, personnel factors, pathogen grow-back, and sam-
pling variability all contribute to the potential for
safety breaches (Bisaillon et al., 1997; Bogetoft and
Olesen, 2003; Roberts et al., 2001; Sofos et al., 1999). 
Firms may also shy away from advertising or estab-
lishing other appropriability mechanisms if there is
value in some level of anonymity. If appropriability
systems increase the probability that a firm will be
identified in the case of food safety problems and be
exposed to liability, then the firm may have an incen-
tive to forgo appropriating the benefits of a good
safety record and to remain anonymous. The benefits
of branding, third-party verification, specific quality
claims, and other appropriability mechanisms may not
outweigh the costs of being more easily linked to a
food product in the case of safety problems. 
Not only does the ability to remain anonymous
dampen the incentive to establish appropriability (and
to innovate), it also reduces the threat of punishment in
the case of safety lapses, thus further dampening the
incentive to innovate. The complex diets of most con-
sumers, the long incubation periods of many food-
borne pathogens, incomplete lab analyses of intestinal
illnesses, and the fact that the food evidence is usually
destroyed (eaten) all reduce the chances of identifying
producers of unsafe foods (Buzby et al., 2001). Firms
are often able to avoid the negative consequences of
safety lapses, including fines, recalls, bad publicity, or
litigation because consumers and government regula-
tors are unable to identify the source of foodborne ill-
ness. The incentive to invest in food safety is reduced
because the probability of detection and punishment in
the case of safety failures is less than one. 
All in all, the problem of asymmetric information in
the market for food safety has the potential to reduce
incentives to invest in food safety innovation. The dif-
ficulty of advertising and differentiating food on the
basis of safety attributes reduces the ability of firms to
appropriate the benefits of safety innovation, thereby
reducing producers’ incentives to invest in safety inno-
vation. Producers’ incentives to invest to overcome
appropriability constraints are in turn damped by the
fact that anonymity is valuable in the case of food
safety problems. As a result, the amount of food safety
and food safety innovation supplied by the market is
likely to be lower than the socially optimal amount. 
The Nature of the Product May Dampen
Demand for Food Safety
Consumers also play a role in slowing the develop-
ment of markets for food safety and in dampening
incentives to invest in food safety. Skeptical, discern-
ing consumers are not the norm when it comes to food
safety attributes. Most consumers are unaware of the
specifics of food production—and many may prefer to
stay that way. For example, Kuchler (2001) argues that
consumers do not really want to know the content of
most processed meat and, as a result, labels indicating
that a product contains “meat” are preferable to more
specific labels indicating what meat actually is, such
as the official “Muscle tissue of cattle, sheep, swine,
goats, or equines which is skeletal or found in the
tongue, diaphragm, heart, or esophagus with or with-
out accompanying or overlaying fat, bone, skin, sinew,
nerve, or blood vessel which are not separated during
dressing” (USDA, FSIS, no date).
Whether they do not want to know or just do not have
the time to learn, consumers do not know very much
about how food is produced or about food safety. In
the United States, both marketplace behavior and sur-
vey results indicate that most consumers are not very
knowledgeable about food content or production prac-
tices. Throughout the 1990s, surveys found that only
30 to 40 percent of consumers in the United States
were aware of the use of biotechnology in food pro-
duction and most were unaware of general food pro-
duction techniques. 
The low level of consumer knowledge about food
safety makes it difficult to gauge the size and depth
of the market for food safety. The low level of
knowledge may also contribute to the susceptibility
of this market to large perturbations after foodborne
illness outbreaks: well-publicized outbreaks may be
many consumers’ sole source of safety information.
In fact, dramatic and highly publicized outbreaks
have often driven sharp increases in demand for
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of high-profile scares, including those involving
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or mad
cow disease) and dioxin-contaminated feed have
triggered increased demand for food safety. In the
United States, the 1993 outbreak of E. coli O157:H7
in Jack-in-the-Box hamburgers led to a dramatic
decrease in demand and the company lost around
$160 million in the 18 months following the out-
break (Roberts et al., 1997). 
If the size and intensity of consumer demand have
the same impact on food safety innovation as they
do on innovation in other industries, then the rather
nebulous and episodic demand for food safety 
probably dampens incentives to invest in food safety
innovation. 
Asymmetric Information Helps Spur
Imitation and Technological Spillover
Asymmetric information problems may ultimately
amplify the benefits of food safety innovations by pro-
viding innovating firms with an incentive to share new
technologies with their competitors. A food safety prob-
lem in one firm or one segment of an industry has the
potential to discredit a whole industry because con-
sumers cannot distinguish safe and unsafe product and
producers. For example, the BSE outbreak in the United
Kingdom dampened beef markets around the world, not
just markets where producers used feed containing mam-
malian protein. As a result, safe producers have an
incentive to try to raise the safety level of the whole
industry. The desire of safe firms to protect themselves
from negative publicity means that spillovers could be
large in food safety. This observation may help explain
why the American Meat Institute, the National Chicken
Council, the National Cattlemen’s Associations, and
other industry groups support food safety research activi-
ties and information dissemination. 
The same incentive does not exist in other markets. For
example, faulty brakes on one brand of cars do not hurt
business for other brands of cars. A car brand with an
innovative new braking system has no incentive to share
the discovery with its competitors in order to bolster the
reputation of the industry. However, because of asym-
metric information problems in markets for meat safety,
massive recalls of hamburger, for example, shake con-
sumer confidence in the whole industry. Hamburger-
borne disease outbreaks hurt everyone in the industry,
and innovation to reduce such outbreaks helps everyone
in the industry—including the innovating firm. In the
hamburger industry, and many other food industries,
negative spillovers provide an added incentive to inno-
vate and disseminate innovation. 
Firms also have an incentive to share new technologies
with their competitors and with government regulators
to influence the standard of care in the industry. In
some cases, standards of care that are difficult to meet
can help establish a barrier that benefits the firms that
first adopt such standards. First adopters gain larger
market shares (and maybe market power) if the
expense of new technologies forces some producers
out of business. Even if all firms eventually adopt the
technology, first adopters will benefit from limited
competition during the period when their competitors
are installing the new technologies. Such benefits may
help explain why the large meat and poultry slaughter
and processing plants generally have supported stricter
food safety regulation. 
Imitative spillovers of innovations are prevalent in the
food processing industry. Levin et al. (1987), in their
survey of American firms, report that many in the food
processing industry found patents ineffective because
they often did not withstand legal challenges. Eleven
of 130 industries in the Levin et al. survey, all from the
food processing and metalworking sectors, reported
that no mechanism of appropriating the returns from
product innovation was even moderately effective. 
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for food safety may dampen two of the primary drivers
of innovation: appropriability and market demand.
Because safety is a credence attribute, firms may have
difficulty appropriating the benefits of food safety inno-
vation—and given the graphic nature of many safety
attributes, even firms with the safest records may have
little incentive to disclose their records, if it means rais-
ing consumer concerns about food safety. In addition,
firms may actually avoid establishing appropriability, if
it also entails an increased likelihood of facing liability
when food safety problems arise. On the demand side,
consumers are largely unknowledgeable about food
safety practices and tend not to demand product differen-
tiation on the basis of food safety. 
With little incentive for safety disclosure on the part of
firms, and episodic demand from consumers, it is
almost surprising that any firms invest in improved
food safety and continue to innovate to improve food
safety. Yet they do. How do they overcome the disin-
centives discussed above? 
To investigate this question, we turn to evidence from
the meat industry. The meat industry is an important
industry in which to investigate these questions for three
reasons. First, though our meat products are some of the
safest in the world, food safety remains a critical issue
within the industry. Meat and poultry are estimated to be
responsible for more than 40 percent of human illnesses
associated with four common pathogens (USDA, 1996,
p. 733). The meat industry has also experienced a num-
ber of large, well-publicized recalls and has been at the
heart of some of the Nation’s most tragic foodborne ill-
ness outbreaks (see box “The 1993 Jack in the Box
Restaurant E. coli O157:H7 Outbreak”). 
Second, controlling pathogen contamination in meat pro-
duction, particularly ground meat production, is a chal-
lenging task. Pathogens can be introduced and or
amplified at many stages along the production, process-
ing, and retailing chain (Roberts, Ahl, and McDowell,
1995). Farm inputs may bring pathogens onto the farm,
and production practices on the farm may increase
pathogen numbers, as well as expose food animals to
new pathogens. Transportation may cause stress in ani-
mals, increasing shedding and the spread of pathogens.
Slaughtering procedures may spread pathogens among
animals, carcasses, and cuts of meat. Processing and
product fabrication may encourage the growth of exist-
ing pathogens and introduce new pathogens through
worker handling, ingredients, poor temperature control,
and the water used in processing. Hamburger production,
in which scraps of meat are ground into a homogeneous
product, introduces the potential for integrating
pathogens throughout the product. The transportation of
meat products to wholesale/retail operations may result
in pathogen growth, cross-contamination of products, or
introduction of new pathogens. How foods are stored
and displayed affects pathogen growth through tempera-
ture control, possibilities for cross-contamination, and
length of shelf-life. How food is handled in the kitchen
affects the probability that pathogens multiply or cross-
contaminate other products. Hamburgers that are not
thoroughly cooked may harbor pathogens in the interior
of the patty. 
The challenge of controlling pathogens in meat produc-
tion makes the industry particularly fertile ground for
food safety innovation: the potential for killing or con-
trolling pathogen growth exists at all or most points
along the production chain. This potential, along with
technological and methodological advances in pathogen
control, contributes to making the meat industry particu-
larly interesting for a study on food safety innovation.
The development of new tests for microbial pathogens
has created additional options for detecting unwanted
pathogens associated with meat. Improved analytical
tools for risk assessment, new processes and equipment
to kill pathogens, as well as new procedures and man-
agement systems to control pathogens, have all led to
reduced levels of pathogen contamination and greater
efficiency in pathogen control at many different stages
in the meat production chain. 
The third reason the meat industry is an important indus-
try in which to examine food safety innovations is its
size and diversity. The Food Safety and Inspection
Service of USDA (FSIS) and State inspection agencies
monitor about 2,500 establishments that process meat or
poultry products as their primary business activity.2
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ducing meat and poultry products. However, the vast majority of
these plants have other businesses that are much larger than their
meat and poultry operations. The Bureau of the Census identifies a
little more than 3,000 manufacturing plants producing meat and
poultry products. Of those plants, we estimate that only about 2,500
have meat or poultry manufacturing as their primary line of business.
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The 1993 Jack in the Box Restaurant E. coli O157:H7 Outbreak 
In 1993, a Seattle pediatrician noticed an unusual spike
in the number of children with bloody diarrhea. He
alerted Washington State health officials about a possible
foodborne disease outbreak. Within a week of document-
ing the diarrheal disease outbreak, health department
investigators identified E. coli O157:H7-contaminated
hamburgers from Jack in the Box restaurants as the
cause. In all, 73 Jack in the Box restaurants in the States
of Washington, Idaho, California, and Nevada were
involved in the outbreak and recall. Seven hundred peo-
ple became ill and four children died. Epidemiologists at
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention con-
cluded that the outbreak resulted from errors in meat
processing and cooking (Bell et al., 1994).
Epidemiologists had been following E. coli O157:H7
since 1982, when the pathogen was first linked to human
illness in a two-State outbreak associated with hamburg-
ers from McDonald’s (Bryan et al., 1994). They soon
discovered that the E. coli pathogen had interacted with
Shigella, a well-known, virulent pathogen, to develop the
ability to produce the toxin causing the human illnesses.
In 1985, epidemiologists documented E. coli O157:H7
as the leading cause of acute kidney failure in children,
and in 1992 they concluded that it was the most common
bacterial cause of bloody diarrhea. 
The 1993 Jack in the Box E. coli O157:H7 outbreak
marked an important turning point in epidemiologists'
approach to E. coli O157:H7 and infectious disease in
general (Editor, 1993). Before the outbreak and the full-
blown emergence of E. coli O157:H7 as a foodborne
pathogen, many epidemiologists had predicted that the
discovery of sulfa and penicillin would eliminate infec-
tious diseases as a public health problem. 
Repercussion from the outbreak—and the newly recog-
nized public health threat—were widespread. Within the
18 months following the outbreak, the Jack in the Box
company lost approximately $160 million in reduced
sales and other costs (Roberts et al., 1997). These costs
included those associated with the company's voluntary
recall of all hamburger meat from their restaurants. They
also included legal costs. A number of ill customers and
parents of ill or dead children filed suits against Jack in
the Box and its parent company, Foodmaker, Inc. All
cases were settled out of court, with one family receiving
over $15 million for a child who was brain damaged.
Stockholders also filed suit against the company for
court costs and lost sales due to adverse publicity.
The Federal Government responded to the Jack in the Box
outbreak in several ways. President Clinton signaled the
importance of the outbreak by sending the Secretary of
Agriculture to testify before the Washington State legisla-
ture. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) raised the
recommended internal temperature for hamburgers cooked
in restaurants to 155o F. USDA's Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) initiated several programs after
the outbreak: a safe-food-handling label with instructions
for consumers on packages of raw meat and poultry sold in
supermarkets, an information campaign alerting school
children to eat hamburgers cooked well-done, and tests for
E. coli O157:H7 in raw ground beef prepared in federally
inspected establishments and in retail stores. FSIS also
changed the status of E. coli O157:H7, declaring it an
adulterant in raw ground beef. As a result of the outbreak,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
obtained additional funding for its FoodNet program to
identify foodborne pathogens causing intestinal illness. The
outbreak also accelerated efforts to modernize Federal
requirements for food safety using the Pathogen Reduction
and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (PR/
HACCP) system (see box “Pathogen Reduction and Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point Program, p. 14”). 
The outbreak united parents of those children who had
become ill in the outbreak to create the first consumer
activist group devoted to food safety, Safe Tables Our
Priority (STOP). STOP has been a very visible lobbying
group for safer food at congressional and USDA hearings,
at professional conferences, and in the media (for example,
see Eskin et al., 2003). 
The 1993 outbreak also spurred the beef industry to fund
research. The Washington Beef Commission supported
research on techniques for detecting E. coli O157:H7 in
hamburger (Bell et al. 1994) and the National Cattlemen's
Beef Association (NCBA) set up a task force to fund
research on how to reduce E. coli O157:H7 in cattle and
slaughterhouses, as well as how to establish testing and
sampling programs to detect the pathogen. The interven-
tions developed by the NCBA have a high rate of adoption
by the industry (Smith, 2003). The NCBA spends an aver-
age of $2.5 million on food safety research and technology
each year (Voldseth, 2002). In early 2003, NCBA helped
form a new committee, the Beef Industry Food Safety
Council (BIFSCo), with representatives from all segments
of the beef industry. BIFSCo's mission is to develop indus-
try-wide, science-based strategies to solve the problem of
E. coli O157:H7 and other foodborne pathogens in beef
(Beef Food Industry Safety Council, 2003). These establishments can be grouped into five cate-
gories: producers of cooked or otherwise further
processed products with no slaughter operations; raw
meat processors with no slaughter operations; and cattle,
hog, and poultry slaughter plants. Some slaughter plants
engage in a wide range of processing, and some cattle
slaughter plants slaughter animals other than cattle,
including hogs, sheep, and goats.
The main products of cooked meat processors include
roast beef and other cooked meats, luncheon meats and
frankfurters, bacon and other smoked products, pepper-
oni and other fermented products, and raw meat prod-
ucts. Raw meat processors with no slaughter operations
produce mainly ground beef and pork, fabricated cuts,
and other raw products. Carcasses and hamburger and
other boneless beef are the chief products of cattle
slaughter plants while carcasses and cooked and other
further processed products are the main outputs of hog
slaughter plants. Poultry plants, in contrast to hog and
cattle slaughter, sell mainly cut-up products (about half
of their output) and products processed beyond cut-up
(about a quarter of their output). 
In 1997, the meat and poultry industry supplied about
$110 billion of output. Cattle and hog slaughtering
was by far the largest sector, accounting for about half
of industry output. Poultry slaughter and processing
amounted to about $31 billion in sales, while cooked
and raw meat processors without slaughter operations
accounted for the final quarter of industry output.
Cattle and hog slaughter plants were also more numer-
ous than poultry slaughter plants, with 1,400 plants
and over 140,000 employees. Poultry slaughtering had
about one-third the number of plants, but, due to the
much larger size of its plants, employed about 225,000
workers in 1997. There were also a large number
(about 1,300) of raw- and cooked-meat processors but
they employed only about 90,000 workers (Bureau of
the Census, 1999 a, b, and c). 
The cattle slaughter industry, the focus of the case
studies, had an output of about $28 billion in 1997, the
vast majority of which was supplied by the 300 feder-
ally inspected plants (USDA, FSIS, 1999). The indus-
try has become increasingly concentrated in the last
three decades, with its four-firm concentration ratio
(the share of the industry’s output held by the four
largest producers in the industry) exhibiting a dramatic
increase from 1963 to 1992 (table A-2). The growth of
large cattle slaughter plants during this period is also
striking. Table A-3 shows that the percent of animals
slaughtered in large plants grew from 12 percent in
1977 to 65 percent in 1997 (MacDonald et al., 2000).
Eighty percent of steers were slaughtered in large
plants in 1997. Table A-4 shows that over the 1977-92
time period, large plants’ share of industry value of
shipments grew from 31 percent to 72 percent
(MacDonald et al., 2000). 
Large cattle slaughter plants differ from small plants 
in more than just the volume of production. They also
vary with respect to the diversity of inputs and outputs,
with smaller plants processing a more diverse set of
animals and products than large plants. A recent sur-
vey of cattle slaughter plants found that smaller plants
slaughtered hogs and other animals such as sheep 
and goats while larger plants slaughtered only cattle
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Table A-2—Four-firm concentration ratios, value of
shipments basis
Slaughter industry
Year Cattle Hogs Chickens Turkeys
1963 26 33 14 23
1967 26 30 23 28
1972 30 32 18 41
1977 25 31 22 41
1982 44 31 32 40
1987 58 30 42 38
1992 71 43 41 45
Source: MacDonald et al. (2000).
Table A-3—Percent of animals slaughtered in large plants
Slaughter classes (size cutoff1)
Year All cattle Steers Heifers Cows/bulls Hogs Sheep/lambs
(500,000)1 (500,000)1 (1 million)1 (150,000)1 (1 million)1 (300,000)1
1977 12 16 nr 10 38 42
1982 28 36 nr 15 59 73
1987 51 63 31 20 72 84
1992 61 76 34 38 86 74
1997 65 80 60 62 87 75
1The size cutoff, in parentheses, refers to the minimum number of animals slaughtered annually in the large plant category.
Source: MacDonald et al. (2000).(table A-5). Smaller plants also processed more meat
into further processed products than did larger plants.
Larger plants preferred to sell trim products to other
processors for further processing (table A-6). 
To investigate drivers of safety innovation in the meat
industry, we first examine recently completed survey
data of U.S. meat and poultry slaughter and processing
plants. These data reveal the characteristics of firms
that do and do not innovate or adopt new food safety
technologies or methodologies. This information helps
to reveal the incentives and constraints to food safety
innovation and imitation in slaughter and processing
plants. We then turn to two case studies of innovation
in the beef industry. The first case study examines the
development and marketing of a new food safety tech-
nology. The second examines the development of a
microbial management system for hamburger patties. 
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Table A-6—Product output share by plant size for cattle slaughter plants1
Small plants2 Medium plants2 Large plants2
Raw meat products
Carcasses 22.0 29.2 26.3
Ground beef  19.2 15.8 11.2
Trim or other boneless beef or pork 14.8 18.0 27.9
Sub-primal and fabricated cuts 10.2 14.9 15.2
Other raw-meat products 8.0 8.2 9.3
Cooked or otherwise further processed 
products 25.8 31.9 9.1
Mean pounds of output 
(1,000 pounds per year) 186 7,860 260,127
Number of plants 28 95 27
1 Average output shares are based on all reporting plants.
2 Plants in the small category are in the 0-19 percentile of plant sizes; plants in medium category are in the 20-79 percentile;
and plants in large category are in the 80-99 percentile.
Source: Ollinger, Moore, and Chandran (forthcoming).
Table A-5—Annual animal inputs per plant by plant size for cattle slaughter plants1
Small plants2 Medium plants2 Large plants2
Number of animals
Cattle 161 3,448 191,781
Hogs 387 4,178 0
Other animals 
(mostly sheep and goats) 36 1,000 0
Number of plants 28 95 30
1 Animal inputs based only on plants reporting one or more animal input.
2 Plant size categories by percentile of output: plants in small category produced 19 percent of total industry output; plants in medium 
category 20-79 percent of total industry output; and plants in large category produced 80-100 percent of total industry output.
Source: Food Safety Inspection Service, Enhanced Facilities database and the Economic Research Service, Food Safety Technology and
Practices and HACCP costs survey.
Table A-4—Large plants' share of industry value of
shipments1
Slaughter industry
Year Cattle Hogs Chickens Turkeys
1963 31 66 d2 d2
1967 29 63 29 16
1972 32 62 34 15
1977 37 67 45 29
1982 51 67 65 35
1987 58 72 76 64
1992 72 86 88 83
1Large plants are defined as those with more than 400 employees.
2Data cannot be disclosed, in order to retain respondent confiden-
tiality.
Source: MacDonald et al. (2000).An empirical investigation into the level and type of
food safety investments made by meat and poultry
slaughter and processing plants reveals much about the
diffusion of food safety innovation in the meat and
poultry slaughter and processing industries.1 The sur-
vey shows that larger plant size and stronger appropri-
ation mechanisms, particularly those associated with
buyer safety specifications, result in a higher number
of safety investments. In this section, we examine the
findings from this survey and their implications for the
dissemination of food safety innovations. 
ERS Survey Reveals Variation 
in Food Safety Investment 
USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) recently
completed a survey on food safety technologies and
practices in the 1,725 largest meat and poultry slaugh-
ter and processing plants inspected by USDA’s Food
Safety and Inspection Service (Ollinger and Moore,
forthcoming). The overall survey response rate was
about 57 percent or 987 plants.2 Slaughter-plant
respondents accounted for 44 percent of all slaugh-
tered cattle, 77 percent of all slaughtered hogs, 48 per-
cent of all slaughtered chickens, and 55 percent of all
slaughtered turkeys. Respondents among processors
with no slaughter operations accounted for 55 percent
of all processed meat and poultry products. 
Data from the survey include information on plant
size, products, markets, type of food safety invest-
ments, and Pathogen Reduction Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (PR/HACCP) rule compliance
costs (see box “Pathogen Reduction and Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point Program
(PR/HACCP”). The survey contains approximately 40
questions dealing with food safety technologies and
practices covering five broad safety activities: equip-
ment, testing, careful dehiding (for cattle slaughter
plants), sanitation, and plant operations (see box
“Sample questions from the ERS survey ...”, p. 15). 
To compare food safety investments across firms,
Ollinger and Moore (forthcoming) created an index for
each of the five types of food safety activities identi-
fied in the food safety questionnaire. In creating the
index, they adhered to a number of principles. First,
they maintained that the rating system should be
monotonic because more intensive operations should
yield greater food safety protection than less intensive
ones. By monotonic, they meant that plants with more
intensive cleaning or with a certain piece of food
safety equipment have higher scores than plants with
less intensive cleaning or without such equipment.
Second, they compared plant food safety systems on
the basis of similar technology types since some types
of technology, such as plant operations, may have dif-
ferent purposes and long- and short-term effects than
other technologies, such as equipment. Thus, they
assert that the relevant comparisons are the equipment
rating of one plant versus that of another and sanita-
tion of one plant versus that of another, etc. Altogether,
they considered five technology types: equipment, test-
ing, dehiding, sanitation, and plant operations. Third,
since food safety requires a systematic approach, it is
necessary to consider a variety of technology compo-
nents within each technology type. For example, they
considered steam vacuum units, Frigoscandia carcass
pasteurizers, and other food safety equipment as
equipment technologies. Additionally, they categorized
hand and knife cleaning and other cleaning practices
as sanitation technologies. See Ollinger, Moore, and
Chandran (forthcoming) for additional details on tech-
nology components in each technology type.
For the safety index, Ollinger and Moore assigned a
value of 1 to safety activities that generated the most
food safety process control, and a value of 0 to those
that generated the least. They assigned values between
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1 It is worth noting that the Food Safety and Inspection Service
examines all meat and poultry plants engaged in interstate com-
merce for the adequacy of plant food safety controls. Plants
deemed to be using unsanitary production practices are prohibited
from selling products. Thus, all plants must achieve a high level of
food safety quality.
2 This response rate is substantially higher than that achieved in
recent surveys by Hooker et al. (1999) who had a less than 50
percent response rate (41 out of 98 questionnaires) and Boland 
et al. (2001) who reported a 36-percent response rate (18 of 50
questionnaires).
Food Safety Investments in the Meat and Poultry Industries
Survey Results
Michael Ollinger and Danna Moore0 and 1 to activities that indicated an intermediate
level of food safety process control. For example, for
the equipment usage question listed above, Ollinger
and Moore assigned a value of 1 to plants that
responded yes, that they used a steam carcass pasteur-
izer. For the sanitation question, plants earned 0 points
for this activity if they sanitized their drains once per
week, 0.33 point if they sanitized more than once per
week but less than once per day, 0.66 point if they san-
itized more than once per day but less than once per
shift, and 1 point if they sanitized more than once per
shift. Ollinger and Moore then summed the points
within each activity category and divided by the maxi-
mum points possible in that category, i.e., the number
of questions in that category. This number is the firm’s
rating for the specific activity category. Each firm was
given a rating for each of the five activity categories. 
Ollinger and Moore also created an overall safety rat-
ing by summing the total number of points from all
questions and then dividing that number by the total
number of questions. For example, if the entire survey
consisted of only the five questions listed above, then
a plant would receive a total of 3.66 points if it
responded that it 1) has a Frigoscandia pasteurizer, 2)
tests for E. coli 0157:H7, 3) sanitizes drains once per
day, 4) does not offer incentives, and 5) does have a
vacuum at the dehiding area. Since there are five ques-
tions in this hypothetical survey, the plant’s overall
safety rating would therefore be 0.732 (3.66/5).
Other rating schemes are possible. For example, there is
no reason why each technology component should have
an identical maximum score of one. Ollinger and Moore
used an equal rating of one as the maximum value
because, for most technology components, they had no
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Pathogen Reduction and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point Program (PR/HACCP)
The Pathogen Reduction and Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (PR/HACCP) program is
administered by the Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
which is responsible for ensuring the safety of raw
meat and poultry products. The program covers all
Federal- and State-inspected meat and poultry slaugh-
ter and processing plants in the United States, as well
as foreign plants that export meat or poultry products
to the United States. The PR/HACCP final rule was
posted in July 1996 (USDA, FSIS, 1996).
The four major components of the HACCP program
are:
(1) Implementation of a written HACCP plan 
by every slaughter and processing plant; 
(2) Adoption of Sanitation Standard Operating 
Procedures (SSOPs) by every slaughter and 
processing plant; 
(3) Salmonella performance standards for 
slaughter and ground product plants; and 
(4) Generic E. coli performance standards for 
slaughter plants.
The HACCP plan component of the HACCP program
requires each slaughter and processing plant to analyze
its own production processes and identify Critical
Control Points (CCPs) where potential hazards affect
food safety. Plants must then develop a written HACCP
plan and maintain records to ensure that the production
process remains within predetermined critical limits at
each control point, based on parameters such as temper-
ature or chlorine level. The largest plants, 500 or more
employees, had to implement HACCP plans by January
1998. Smaller plants had until 1999 or 2000 to imple-
ment plans, depending on plant size.
The SSOP component of the HACCP program requires
all slaughter and processing plants to prepare a written
plan describing the daily procedures used to ensure san-
itation during production. Plants must also detect, docu-
ment, and correct any sanitation deficiencies. All plants
were required to have SSOPs in place by January 1997.
The Salmonella and generic E. coli performance stan-
dards included in the HACCP program allow FSIS to
monitor whether plants are adequately preventing
pathogen contamination of raw meat and poultry
products. Salmonella was selected for monitoring
because it is one of the most common foodborne
pathogens and is present in a wide variety of raw food
products. Generic E. coli was selected because it is
naturally found in animal feces and serves as an indi-
cator of fecal contamination during production. FSIS
sets maximum acceptable limits for both pathogens,
based on baseline surveys of each class of animal and
food product. All slaughter plants were required to
begin testing for generic E. coli in January 1997.information suggesting that one technology was supe-
rior to another for all the equipment and practices they
considered. Additionally, instead of a proportional rank-
ing scheme, they could have used a logarithmic or
square root scale and still achieved monotonicity. Future
research will refine the rating scale.
Plant Size Influences Amount and 
Type of Food Safety Activity
The ERS survey indicates that plant size influences both
the amount and type of food safety investment, as
reflected in the plant’s food safety ratings. Table B-1
shows how food safety activity varied by cattle slaugh-
ter plant size. The table focuses on cattle slaughter
plants, and not the other types of plants in the survey,
because there is a larger variation in plant size and food
safety activity in this industry. This variation provides a
basis for comparing safety activity across plant size.
Results are similar for other industries unless noted. 
The largest cattle slaughter plants had the highest
overall food safety rating of the size groups as well as
consistently higher ratings across the five food safety
activities than smaller plants. Differences were particu-
larly dramatic in the more capital-intensive food safety
technologies—equipment, testing, and careful dehid-
ing—in which large-plant food safety technology
index values were nearly twice as high as small plant
levels. By contrast, ratings for large plants in the more
labor-intensive technologies—sanitation and opera-
tions—were only about 20 percent higher. 
Much of the difference in food safety rating between
large and small plants is likely due to economies of
scale, particularly with respect to capital-intensive activi-
ties. Large plants have much greater volume of produc-
tion than small plants, lowering their average capital cost
per unit of production. Some equipment that raises car-
cass temperature to 160 degrees or higher can cost more
than $1 million, often requires technical skills that are
available only in large plants with a variety of automated
processes, and can be housed only in very large plants.
Ignoring technical skills and plant size and assuming a
5-year life of the equipment, such equipment would cost
a large plant (processing 100 animals per hour and run-
ning two 8-hour shifts per day, 240 days per year) about
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Sample questions from the ERS survey of food safety in meat and poultry slaughter 
and processing plants
The ERS survey of meat and poultry slaughter and
processing plants contained approximately 40 ques-
tions dealing with food safety technologies and
practices covering five broad safety activities:
equipment, testing, careful dehiding (for cattle
slaughter plants), sanitation, and plant operations.
Complete questionnaires and response rates are on
the ERS website http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/
HACCPSurvey/. A sample question for each safety
activity follows. 
Equipment usage:  
Does this plant use a steam carcass pasteur-
izer, such as a Frigoscandia, to pasteurize 
carcasses?
Testing:  
Over and above that which is required under
PR/ HACCP Rule, does this plant test raw or
cooked product with tests for E. coli 0157:H7
or Listeria?
Sanitation: 
Which one statement best describes how often
drains are sanitized?
1. Drains sanitized once per week.
2. Drains sanitized one or more times per week,
but less than once per day.
3. Drains sanitized one or more times per day,
but less than once per shift.
4. Drains sanitized more than once per shift.
5. Don’t know.
Plant operations:
Does this plant offer worker incentives, such
as gifts or compensation, for detecting and
reporting possible sources of contamination or
unsanitary conditions?
Careful Dehiding:
Does this plant use an air exhaust system vac-
uum or other system that creates a negative
air pressure around the carcass in the dehiding
area?$0.52 per head of cattle in equipment costs alone. By
contrast, it would cost a smaller plant, processing only
two animals per hour, but otherwise operating under the
same conditions, about $26 per head. Note, this estimate
varies with the assumed life of the equipment and con-
siders only capital costs. We have ignored maintenance
costs, housing costs, and the possibility of smaller scale
equipment. Maintenance costs would rise over time and
be more costly for smaller plants because they have
fewer available skills to maintain complex equipment
than do large plants. Housing costs would also be higher
for smaller plants because their much smaller processing
operations often run in batches rather than the continu-
ous mode for which such equipment is designed. Of
course, lower cost and lower volume equipment could
also be designed, but there apparently has been little
demand for it since, to our knowledge, no such units are
for sale, much less installed.
Labor-intensive activities do not require such large
fixed costs, and hence the smaller spread between
large and small plants for more labor-dependent safety
activities. Suppose workers in both the small and large
plant are required to clean their knives after they finish
cutting a carcass and that 10 cuts are made in each car-
cass. Additionally, assume workers are paid $12 per
hour and that each cut takes 1 minute. For both the
small and large plants, the cost per head of cattle for
cleaning the knives is $2.40, so the practice favors nei-
ther large nor small plants. 
Though economies of scale probably explain a large
part of the safety variation between large and small
plants, they do not explain it all—particularly for less
capital—intensive activities. Another possible contribut-
ing factor is linked to the observation that large plants
tend to supply large, homogeneous markets with rela-
tively elastic demand, while smaller plants tend to serve
smaller markets with less elastic demand. In homoge-
neous markets, in which a number of firms produce and
market similar or identical products, any slip in safety
could result in a sharp drop in demand for the offending
plant. Buyers could replace sub-standard products with
product from competing plants. The product from
smaller plants may be less fungible. Small plants tend to
compete with the larger firms by providing differenti-
ated products for niche markets, such as fresher or more
specialized cuts. Their products are less easily replaced,
and their buyers may be more willing to overlook food
safety slips or to work with a plant to overcome safety
problems. To protect their markets, large plants may
therefore have more incentive than small plants to adopt
food safety innovations. 
In fact, slaughter plants that can consistently supply
high levels of product safety, as required by a number
of major food retailers, gain access to almost guaran-
teed markets for large volumes of product. Plants that
can produce the desired level of safety at the lowest
cost will reap the largest benefits, and those that can
supply the desired amount of safety only at higher
prices will face greatly reduced demand. Plants in
markets with relatively elastic demand have incentive
to adopt the most efficient approaches for achieving
product safety. Large slaughter plants operating in
elastic markets may therefore have more incentive to
adopt the safety activities included in the ERS survey
than plants operating in less elastic markets. 
An additional incentive for large firms to innovate is
tied to the observation that large and small firms tend
to face different size markets. As discussed in the
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Table B-1—Large cattle-slaughter plants have higher food safety ratings than small plants, mainly because
of more capital-intensive activities
Plant size category1
Small Medium Large All plants
Safety rating 2
Overall rating 0.43 0.49 0.62 0.50
Equipment 0.32 0.37 0.55 0.39
Testing 0.34 0.48 0.75 0.51
Careful dehiding 0.26 0.36 0.45 0.36
Sanitation 0.51 0.56 0.59 0.56
Operations 0.59 0.60 0.70 0.62
Number of plants 48 158 49 255
1 Plants in the small category are in the 0-19 percentile of plant sizes; plants in medium category are in the 20-79 percentile;
and plants in large category are in the 80-99 percentile.
2 Higher numbers are better. See text for explanation.theory section, even if innovative activity is scale
neutral, the benefits of innovation are proportional to
the size of the market. Holding constant the cost of
innovation, more innovative activity would be
expected in the larger market or in the market
expected to grow more rapidly. This fact may have
spurred large plants, which tend to operate in large
markets, to innovate more than small plants, which
tend to operate in smaller markets. 
Another reason large firms may invest more in food
safety than small firms is that food safety lapses have the
potential to be very costly for large firms because they
may involve large amounts of product. Large amounts of
contaminated product increase both the probability of
detection and the cost of recall. Larger plants have more
potential for larger amounts of contamination than
smaller plants because mistakes that expose product to
contamination spread more quickly the faster the line
speed and the greater the volume of production. 
For example, suppose both large and small plants
clean their dehiding areas once per hour. Assume
also that workers in each plant rupture the intestines
of an animal at the beginning of the hour. A plant
running 100 head of cattle per hour will contaminate
the carcasses of those 100 animals before cleaning
the contaminants while a plant running two head of
cattle per hour will contaminate the carcasses of
only those two animals. The problems do not stop
there, however. If each one of the contaminated cat-
tle has trim that goes into separate bins, then those
100 cattle contaminate 100 bins. Further, if each one
of those 100 bins is then mixed with 20 other bins to
achieve a desired ground meat quality (a common
practice), then the 100 head of cattle would have
contaminated 2,000 bins of meat while the small
plant would have contaminated only 40 bins. The
greater volume of contaminated product produced by
the larger plant increases the likelihood of a
detectable foodborne illness outbreak and the likeli-
hood that the plant will be identified and held liable.
As a result, larger plants may have greater incentive
to invest in food safety activities. 
Appropriability Influences Food 
Safety Investment
The survey data also reveal that meat and poultry
processors that had mechanisms for appropriating the
benefits of food safety innovation used more types of
safety investment and had better safety ratings. Among
the processors in the survey, the appropriability mech-
anism most strongly linked with more safety invest-
ment was buyer specification. When buyers specify
higher safety or quality requirements from their sup-
pliers—and pay a premium or guarantee sales—they
provide processors with a way to benefit from safety
investments. Processors who invest to supply safer
products appropriate the benefits of their investments
through the price premiums or guaranteed sales. 
In the meat industry, a growing number of large buyers,
such as Burger King, Jack in the Box, McDonald’s, and
Wendy’s, require their suppliers to meet safety and
quality standards. These buyers spend millions of dol-
lars advertising their brand names and building reputa-
tions for safety and quality. To protect their brand-name
investments, these buyers set input safety and quality
standards and require their suppliers to meet them.
These standards cover a wide variety of safety activities
ranging from pathogen tolerance levels to accounting
procedures. Buyers enforce the standards through test-
ing and process audits. 
Table B-2 shows a marked difference between cattle
slaughter plants facing buyer specifications and others.
Again, cattle slaughter plants are an interesting case
because of the large variation in safety activity in these
plants. Results are similar for the other industries unless
noted. The largest differences appear for safety activities
requiring the most sophisticated technologies, equip-
ment, testing, and careful dehiding. However, even for
the other two activities, sanitation and plant operations,
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Table B-2—Food safety ratings for cattle slaughter
plants with buyer specifications are considerably
higher than for other plants
Process control  Does customer impose 
method standards1
No Yes
Overall rating 0.43 0.63
Equipment 0.30 0.56
Testing 0.35 0.77
Careful dehiding 0.28 0.48
Sanitation 0.51 0.61
Operations 0.58 0.68
Number of plants2 128 98
1 Question in survey asks, "Do some major customers of plant test
product for pathogens or harmful bacteria or require sanitation and
product handling practices that are more stringent than those
demanded by FSIS?"
2 29 plants did not indicate whether customers impose standards.there is a large difference. The pervasiveness of the dif-
ference in safety activities between firms with and with-
out buyer specifications suggests that buyers establish
standards along a wide spectrum of activities.
Export markets may also entail higher quality speci-
fications. These markets can provide a lucrative out-
let for meat suppliers if plants meet the importing
country’s food safety standards. Table B-3 provides
ratings for food safety technology for cattle slaugh-
ter plants that serve export markets. The pattern of
the ratings, as in table B-2, shows a distinct differ-
ence in plant food safety technology between cattle
slaughter plants that export and those that do not.
The magnitude of the differences and their perva-
siveness across all five categories is striking. The
greatest differences are for equipment, testing, and
careful dehiding technologies. The differences are
smaller for sanitation and plant operations, yet a
substantial gap remains.
Branding should have the same effect on food safety
activity as buyer specifications and export markets.
Meat processors, such as Oscar Meyer, that sell
branded products through retail outlets are held
directly responsible for food safety quality by con-
sumers. These processors, and others who are easily
linked to their product, should have stronger incen-
tives to invest in safety than processors that sell
unbranded products to large grocery stores and
restaurant chains or to a host of smaller buyers that
serve as intermediaries between the slaughter plants
and the consumer. Having no brand name means that
consumers can make no connection between the pro-
ducer and food safety. 
Surprisingly, selling branded product appeared to have
less impact on safety investment than buyer specifica-
tion. Table B-4 shows plant food safety technology dif-
ferences between hog slaughter plants selling products
under their own brand and other plants. The survey data
show only a modest difference in safety activity
between the two types of plants. Dehiding and sanita-
tion are higher for plants not selling products under
their own brand and the other categories are higher for
plants that do sell products under their own brand.
One explanation for this result could be that surveyed
firms may have misunderstood the branding question.
This question asked whether the plant produced prod-
ucts under its own name. The intent of the question was
to see if the plant sold branded products to consumers.
However, the overwhelming majority of all plants
responded affirmatively. Yet, most plants, particularly
cattle slaughter plants, do not sell directly to consumers.
Thus, it appears that respondents understood the ques-
tion to be whether the product was shipped to a cus-
tomer with the producer’s name on the box, regardless
of whether it was going to final consumers or vendors
to be repackaged or further processed. 
The confusion over the branding question resulted in a
watered-down definition of branded for the analysis:
“branded” denotes plants that either sell a branded
product to consumers or put their name on a box of
products that are shipped elsewhere for processing.
The very modest differential illustrated in table B-4
shows that selling under a brand, as defined here,
failed to generate much of a difference in the use of
food safety technologies.
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Table B-3—Food safety ratings for cattle slaughter
plants that serve export markets are higher than
for non-exporters
Process control  Does plant export 
method products1
No Yes
Overall rating 0.43 0.64
Equipment 0.28 0.62
Testing 0.36 0.79
Careful dehiding 0.28 0.51
Sanitation 0.54 0.60
Operations 0.59 0.68
Number of plants2 169 84
1 Question on survey asks, "Does this plant export products 
outside the United States?"
2 2 plants did not indicate whether they export.
Table B-4—Food safety rating of hog slaughter
plants that sell products under their own brand 
are about the same as other plants
Process control  Is product sold under 
method plant’s own brand?1
No Yes
Overall rating 0.44 0.50
Equipment 0.34 0.39
Testing 0.40 0.50
Careful dehiding 0.32 0.30
Sanitation 0.59 0.55
Operations 0.52 0.61
Number of plants2 25 180
1 Question on survey asks, "Does this plant produce products 
under its own brand?"
2 5 plants did not indicate whether they sell products under their 
own brand.The effects of the appropriability mechanisms were
similar for cattle, poultry, and pork slaughter plants;
however, the effect of one of the appropriability
mechanisms was slightly different for processors.
Table B-5 summarizes responses for cooked-meat
processors without slaughter operations (results were
similar for raw-meat processors). The table shows
that plants with buyer specifications had distinctly
higher equipment and testing activity ratings than
plants without, but nearly identical ratings for sanita-
tion and plant activities. 
Why did buyer specifications not have the same posi-
tive effect on sanitation and plant activities? One pos-
sible explanation for the higher testing rating for plants
with customer requirements is that the buyer may
demand proof that the products it buys are safe. The
almost equal scores for plants with or without cus-
tomer requirements for sanitation and plant operations
could be due to the nature of the meat processing
industry compared to animal slaughtering. Processing
plants tend to sell unique products that can be readily
linked to the producer. This linkage forces producers
to adhere to as strict a standard as a buyer would
require explicitly in a contract since buyers, regardless
of whether they have specifications, can readily punish
a plant that practices poor food safety quality control.
Slaughter plants, on the other hand, produce generic
products that cannot be distinguished from products
from other plants with which they may be commin-
gled. Thus, without buyer specifications, slaughter
plants may feel they can adhere to weaker sanitation
and food safety operating activities.
Appropriability Mechanisms 
Encouraged Early Adoption of 
HACCP-Like Programs
The influence of appropriability is also evident in rates
of adoption of HACCP-like programs prior to imple-
mentation of PR/HACCP (see box “Pathogen
Reduction and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point Program (PR/HACCP”). HACCP programs are
designed to enhance safety and quality control man-
agement in food processing operations. Producers who
are able to reap the benefits of improved quality or
safety should have stronger incentives to adopt these
programs than producers who cannot. 
The ERS survey queried plants about their use before
1996 of the three core elements of HACCP programs:
schematics, review of operations, and product or envi-
ronmental testing. If plants had the three core ele-
ments, they were considered to have a HACCP-like
program. Table B-6 shows the relationship between
plants with HACCP-like programs and the three
appropriability mechanisms (branding, buyer specifi-
cations, and export markets). The data indicate that
plants subject to buyer specifications were much more
likely than other plants to have implemented a
HACCP-like process control program before 1996.
ERS Survey Indicates that Buyer
Specifications Are Key to Spurring 
Safety Innovation
The ERS survey shows that plant size and appropri-
ability mechanisms seem to encourage the use of more
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Table B-5—Food safety ratings for three appropriability mechanisms for cooked-meat processing plants
without slaughter operations
Market mechanisms
Process control  Product sold under  Customer food safety 
method own brand requirements Plant exports
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Overall rating 0.55 0.57 0.51 0.64 0.53 0.63
Equipment 0.51 0.55 0.46 0.65 0.49 0.65
Testing 0.67 0.61 0.47 0.78 0.51 0.78
Careful dehiding -- -- -- -- -- --
Sanitation 0.53 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.56
Operations 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.66 0.61 0.65
Number of plants 12 356 202 166 230 138sophisticated food safety technologies. Investments by
large plants could be a response to economies of scale,
greater product demand, and demand elasticity, but
production technologies that make large plants more
likely to be exposed for a food safety failure may also
drive these investments. Appropriability mechanisms,
such as product branding, buyer specifications, and
export markets, enable suppliers to benefit from food
safety and encourage the adoption of a spectrum of
food safety practices and equipment. 
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Table B-6—Percent of plants with HACCP-like programs prior to promulgation of the PR/HACCP rule 
by various appropriability mechanisms
Appropriability mechanisms
Industry category  Product sold under  Customer food safety 
own brand requirements Plant exports
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Percent
Cattle slaughter 16 24 23 49 14 38
Hog slaughter 20 18 15 24 15 22
Poultry slaughter 22 26 12 33 7 29
Processing—cooked-meat 22 25 17 36 18 36
Processing—raw meat 20 24 16 32 17 32
Total number of plants by market mechanism
Cattle slaughter 43 210 128 98 169 84
Hog slaughter 25 180 106 66 138 68
Poultry slaughter 11 99 65 28 16 93
Processing—cooked-meat 23 575 354 244 378 220
Processing—raw meat 109 690 439 360 458 341In 1995, Frigoscandia Equipment began marketing a
Beef Steam Pasteurization System (BSPS), a new tech-
nology designed to kill pathogens on the exterior of
beef carcasses. This case study examines the econom-
ics of the BSPS invention, using published literature
and open-ended interviews of the parties involved in
the invention. The survey questions follow the object
approach in the Oslo Manual (OECD, 1997). (For the
survey questionnaires, see Salay, Caswell, and
Roberts, 2003). 
The BSPS case study highlights the importance of col-
laboration between technology developers and users in
successful food safety innovation. It also highlights the
difficulty of designing and successfully marketing
technologies for the control of pathogen contamination
in meat. Pathogen control requires systematic control
throughout the farm-to-table supply chain (Ahl,
Roberts, and McDowell, 1995; Gill, 1999). While
some steps in pathogen control can substitute for each
other, often the controls are complementary in produc-
ing an increased probability of safe food. Even the
best technology, however, can be undermined by defi-
ciencies in control along the supply chain. The inter-
linked nature of the steps required to control pathogens
(and prevent them from growing) means that the tech-
nological success of one particular piece of equipment
may be difficult to accurately determine and market. 
The BSPS equipment is the invention of Frigoscandia
Equipment, though its successful adaptation to beef
slaughter plants was also due to contributions from
Excel, the second largest U.S. beefpacking company (a
division of Cargill, Inc.) and microbiological data from
collaborators at Kansas State University (KSU). The
BSPS technology uses steam to kill pathogens on beef
carcasses. The BSPS unit itself is contained in a stain-
less steel cabinet that is installed at the end of the
slaughter line, just before the sides of beef (hanging
from an overhead rail) enter the chiller. Within the
BSPS cabinet, three procedures are performed:
 Air is blown onto the carcass to remove the film of
water covering the side of beef. This permits the
steam to reach and kill the surface bacterial
pathogens that otherwise would be protected by the
water film.
 Steam is applied to the side of the beef at a suffi-
cient temperature and over a sufficient time period
to kill the target pathogens, generally E. coli
O157:H7, Salmonella, and generic E. coli. The
industry commonly uses steam heated to 190o
Fahrenheit (F) applied for 10-15 seconds to the
sides of beef (Brodziak, 2002), though individual
plants may vary temperature and time depending on
the stringency of their safety requirements. 
 Icy water is briefly poured over the carcass to help
bring back the “bloom” (red color) to the carcass
and to stop the depth of “cooking.”
The 1993 E. coli O157:H7 outbreak from hamburgers
from Jack in the Box was the key initiating event in the
development of the BSPS. First, it increased consumer
awareness of and demand for food safety. After this out-
break, consumers, retailers, government officials, and
processors themselves began to reassess the beef indus-
try’s food safety standards. The outbreak forced compa-
nies to respond to growing customer and consumer
concerns, if for no other reason than to avoid legal lia-
bility suits. Second, the outbreak accelerated efforts to
modernize Federal requirements for food safety using
the Pathogen Reduction and Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (PR/HACCP) system (see box
“Pathogen Reduction and Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Point Program). PR/HACCP provided food
processors with more flexibility to innovate and adopt
new safety technologies, such as the BSPS. In addition,
the increased testing for pathogens included in
PR/HACCP increased the probability that a foodborne
disease outbreak would be discovered. The testing also
potentially increased demand for food safety innova-
tions such as the BSPS. 
The initial assessment of the steam pasteurization
technology for reducing pathogen contamination of
beef was encouraging. Engineers at Frigoscandia
Equipment considered the BSPS’s technological
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Tanya Roberts and Elisabete Salayrisks to be low (Wilson, 2001 and 2002). Steam, the
technology behind the BSPS, was well-known for its
ability to kill pathogens, and early experiments in
the meat and poultry industry, though mixed, were
promising enough to interest Frigoscandia in the
technology (table C-1). Discussions with key people
in the U.S. beef industry were positive, indicating
potential market demand. 
Discussions with consumer activists indicated that they
considered steam a safe and acceptable method for
killing pathogens. Surveys of consumers have indi-
cated that steam pasteurization is more acceptable than
some other new food safety technologies such as irra-
diation (Fingerhut et al., 2001). However, the extent of
pathogen reduction is also important to consumer eval-
uations of competing food safety technologies (Lusk
and Hudson, forthcoming). 
Given the positive initial assessment of the innovation,
Frigoscandia Equipment funded an exploration of the
technical feasibility of the project. Frigoscandia
Equipment realized a substantial investment would be
required to develop the equipment. Building the
machinery and testing the efficacy of the procedure
would require time and financial commitment. Whether
the BSPS innovation would prove financially profitable
would depend on how well the BSPS equipment
reduced pathogens, the cost of the equipment, and the
cost and benefits of alternative pathogen-control sys-
tems available to beefpacking plants. Would the domes-
tic beef industry consider the pathogen-reduction
benefits worth the purchase price of the equipment?
Would the innovation succeed in global markets?
History of BSPS Invention:
Collaboration and Risk Sharing
The Swedish company, Frigoscandia Equipment, had
extensive experience with inventing and marketing
equipment in cold storage and food transportation (see
Timeline in appendix A). By keeping foods at a very
low temperature, food product quality was improved,
shelf-life was extended, and food safety concerns were
met. Frigoscandia’s ultra-cold storage unit was being
used for long-distance meat shipment by 1950. Its
FLoFREEZE, a belt-type freezer tunnel, was named
one of the 10 most important Swedish inventions ever
by the Chalmers University of Technology in
Gothenburg, Sweden. Steam pasteurization was a new
food safety technology, a complementary addition to
the company’s product line, and a new marketing
opportunity for Frigoscandia Equipment.
To reduce the technological risks and share the costs
of creating the new BSPS technology, Frigoscandia
Equipment contacted a business client, Excel, the sec-
ond largest U.S. beefpacking company, which agreed
to collaborate on the BSPS invention. Excel had the
day-to-day knowledge of operating beefpacking plants
where the equipment was to be used. Though the two
companies jointly developed the technology and
applied for the patent, Frigoscandia Equipment holds
the rights to the patent on this technology because the
global beef industry was the target sales market. If
Excel co-held the rights to the patent, other beef com-
panies may have been reluctant to purchase equip-
ment, thinking they would be supporting a competitor. 
As a first test of the technology’s efficacy,
Frigoscandia Equipment built a prototype BSPS unit.
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Table C-1—History of U.S. steam pasteurization experiments on meat and poultry
Year of publication Product  Results and effectiveness against bacteria Researcher(s)
1972 Hog carcass Steam effective, significant distortion of pigskin Carpenter
1972 Meat surfaces Steam applied in jacketed chamber; effective Vogel and Silliker
1979 Frozen and  Steam applied with a nozzle 10 cm away, Anderson, Marshall,
thawed beef not effective  Stringer, & Naumann
1985 Chicken carcass Steam chamber with continuous flow, mixed  Davidson, D'aoust,
results, cooked appearance of skin and Awell
1994 Beef frankfurters Steam chamber to "surface pasteurize,"  Cygnarowicz-Provost,
effective against Listeria—4 log reduction Whiting, and Craig
1996 Sheep, beef Steam treatment is effective if meat is first  Dorsa, Cutter, Siragusa,
air-dried and Koohmaraie
Source: Data from Phebus et al., 1997.Preliminary tests at Frigoscandia Equipment found
that the BSPS prototype successfully killed the
pathogen on small pieces of beef inoculated with E.
coli O157:H7.
Next Frigoscandia Equipment and Excel decided to
add academic microbiologists to the team as outside,
nonbiased evaluators of the performance of the BSPS
prototype. Dr. Randall Phebus at Kansas State
University (KSU) was chosen to head the academic
team. Frigoscandia Equipment shipped the prototype
steam pasteurization system to KSU. Excel supplied
six live market-weight steers. Both Frigoscandia
Equipment and Excel contributed the kits and other
materials required for pathogen tests of beef samples. 
After slaughter at KSU, meat samples were inoculated
with 5 logs of a pathogen (100,000 organisms/cm2)
and then treated in the BSPS prototype. All three
pathogens tested, E. coli O157:H7, Salmonella
typhimurium, and Listeria monocytogenes,w e r e
reduced by 4.65 to 5 logs at 15 seconds of steam treat-
ment at 196-99o F (table C-2 and fig. C-1). Dr. Phebus
and his team concluded that “Steam pasteurization is
an effective method for reducing pathogenic bacterial
populations on surfaces of freshly slaughtered beef…”
(Phebus et al., 1997, p. 476). 
The researchers found steam pasteurization provided
numerically greater pathogen reductions than any other
single treatment studied. One reason for this result is
that steam vapor uniformly blankets irregularly shaped
surfaces, in contrast to hot water coming from a nozzle
aimed at carcasses. If there is any irregularity on the
surface of the carcass, the back side of the irregularity
will not receive the hot water treatment and pathogens
lurking there will not be killed. Properly applied steam
can reach these problem areas. BSPS is superior to
chemical rinses for carcasses because it does not entail
treatment of potentially toxic wastewater. 
In 1995, after the success of the prototype at KSU,
Frigoscandia Equipment engineers designed, built, and
installed a commercial sized BSPS unit at an Excel
plant in Sterling, Colorado. This stainless steel
clamshell could hold four sides of beef at a time and
moved along the slaughter line (fig. C-2). It also used
monitoring techniques for temperature and lot identifi-
cation that Frigoscandia Equipment had developed for
its food chilling and freezing equipment. After solving
a number of technical issues related to the pressure,
temperature, and application of the steam in the mov-
ing clamshell BSPS, Wilson (Frigoscandia
Equipment), Leising (Cargill/Excel), and other
Frigoscandia Equipment inventors filed a patent appli-
cation on Nov. 6, 1995 (U.S. Patent, 1998). 
Testing the Commercial-Scale Prototype
To test the efficacy of the commercial scale-up of the
BSPS prototype, Frigoscandia Equipment and Excel
again invited the KSU team into the plant to conduct
tests. The objective was to determine the effectiveness of
the BSPS unit in reducing naturally occurring popula-
tions of indicator organisms on the surfaces of commer-
cially slaughtered beef carcasses. Indicator
microorganisms, not pathogens, were used because of
the danger of introducing pathogens into a commercial
facility. Over a 10-day testing period, 140 carcasses (70
cows and 70 fed cattle-steers/heifers) were tested with
steam applied for 8 seconds at 195-201o F. Twenty car-
casses (9 cows and 11 fed cattle) were tested with steam
applied for 6 seconds. An additional 20 control carcasses
(10 cows and 10 fed cattle) received no steam treatment. 
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Table C-2—Reduction in pathogens as a function of
steam application time in SPS
Seconds of steam  Pathogen reductions in log10 CFU1
used in SPS unit (5 logs inoculated on carcass)
E. coli  Salmonella Listeria
O157:H7 typhimurium monocytogenes
5 seconds 3.37 4.54 4.51
10 seconds 3.57 3.95 4.23
15 seconds 4.65 5.08 5.01
1CFU (colony forming units) is the unit microbiologists use to count
pathogens. 
Source: Data from Phebus et al., 1997.
Figure C-1
Steam pasteurization reduces mean pathogen  
population on beef carcasses















6The KSU team found that steam treatment for 8 sec-
onds was “very effective” in a commercial setting for
reducing overall bacterial populations on beef carcass
surfaces after 24 hours in the chiller (Nutsch et al.,
1997, p. 491). In most cases, the enteric bacteria
(some of which can be pathogens) were undetectable
after pasteurization. Reductions in bacterial popula-
tions after a 6-second steam exposure time were very
similar to those obtained with an 8-second exposure
time. The equipment worked equally well with cows
and steers/heifers, despite considerable variations in
carcass size and shape. 
For the third set of tests in 1996, Frigoscandia
Equipment installed a moving clamshell BSPS in a
larger commercial facility, Excel’s plant in Fort
Morgan, Colorado. Again, KSU conducted the testing
(Nutsch et al., 1998). This time, the testing team made
several changes to the testing protocol to more closely
approximate an actual plant operation. Samples were
randomly selected from 200 carcasses from two pro-
duction shifts, rather than the known carcasses in the
earlier test at the Sterling plant. Steam temperature
was lowered to 180o F. for either 8 or 6.5 seconds.
Instead of excising a small piece of meat to test,
sponges were swabbed over the carcass and the liquid
was tested to see if microbes were detected. Twenty
carcasses were sampled at five carcass locations to see
if the steam treatment effectiveness differed at the five
sites. The KSU team concluded that the BSPS moving
clamshell unit was effective in reducing natural bacter-
ial populations on freshly slaughtered beef carcasses.
Frigoscandia Equipment submitted the KSU’s laboratory
results on pathogen reduction to USDA. USDA regula-
tory approval of the BSPS process was a necessary step
for commercial acceptance. The KSU data was shared
with regulators, industry members, and consumer
groups. In December 1995, USDA certified that
Frigoscandia Equipment’s BSPS moving clamshell can
significantly reduce pathogens (Cargill, 1995). The
BSPS is equipped with recordkeeping capabilities: car-
cass identification, carcass surface temperature in the
steam chamber, exposure time, and deviations are auto-
matically logged into a computer for plant monitoring
and regulatory review. The monitoring features make it
feasible to use the BSPS as a critical control point under
FSIS PR/HACCP regulations.
In 1996, another food processing equipment innovator,
Chicago-based FMC FoodTech (FMC) purchased
Frigoscandia Equipment (table C-3). FMC has 100
years of experience designing and selling food-pro-
cessing equipment. FMC manufactures a wide variety
of “in-container” sterilization systems, such as canning
and retort systems. FMC was particularly interested in
Frigoscandia Equipment for its GyroCompact freezer.
The purchase of Frigoscandia Equipment’s freezing
and chilling equipment complemented FMC’s sterili-
zation equipment. In 2001, FMC’s sales were $2 bil-
lion annually, of which $150 million were
Frigoscandia Equipment sales (Brodziak, 2001 and
2002). Though the BSPS technology was not an
important factor in the Frigoscandia Equipment pur-
chase, it did add another piece of food safety equip-
ment to the FMC product line. 
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Figure C-2
Beef sides exiting the SPS clamshell unit in
Sterling, Colorado
Source: Tanya Roberts.Development of the Static-Chamber BSPS
The KSU researchers had noted two problems with
operating the moving clamshell BSPS unit at the Fort
Morgan plant: 1) The steam pasteurization treatment
was somewhat less effective at the neck area, perhaps
because the steam inlet valves were only at the top of
the moving BSPS clamshell. 2) A small percentage of
carcasses were not steam treated during the two sam-
pling days because of occasional cycle failure (Nutsch
et al., 1998, p. 576). This last problem was caused by
problems synchronizing the timing of the moving
clamshell unit on fast line speeds—a problem that
could not be readily fixed. 
To address these problems, Frigoscandia Equipment
decided to redesign the BSPS as a static chamber. The
BSPS-Static Chamber unit (BSPS-SC) envelopes the
sides of beef as they move along the overhead rail
from the slaughter floor to the chiller. The static cham-
ber performs the same three processes as the moving
unit, except that with the static unit, the sides of beef
travel through the enclosed chamber and sequentially
receive 1) dewatering treatment, 2) steam treatment, 3)
cold water shower (fig. C-3). With the BSPS-SC
design, carcasses can travel through the chamber at
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Table C-3—General characteristics of Frigoscandia
Equipment, 2001
Main activity Designing, installing, and maintaining 
equipment and their monitoring mecha-
nisms for the food processing industry.
Main products Freezing and chilling equipment (half of 
world's frozen food is frozen in 
Frigoscandia Equipment units); steam 
pasteurization systems 
Number of  Around 300 employees all over the 
employees world, primarily involved in sales, service,
or engineering
Sales Around $150 million annually, primarily 
in the chilling and freezing business
Exports Half of sales are in USA, almost half in 
Europe. Sales growth areas are Latin 
America and East Asia
Parent Company: Sales of about $2 billion annually.
Headquarters in Chicago. Emphasis on 
FMC FoodTech solutions (R&D centers around world),
food safety (innovative technologies),
and  service (technical support, HACCP 
certification)































Beef Steam Pasteurization System — Static Chamber Unit
Figure C-3any chosen line speed. The doors and the overhead rail
(on which the carcasses hang) have seals to maintain
the positive air pressure in the chamber. In January
1998, Wilson (Frigoscandia Equipment), Leising
(Excel), and other Frigoscandia Equipment inventors
filed a patent application for a static chamber system
that uses steam to destroy surface pathogens on meat
(U.S. Patent, 1999).
The BSPS-SC has several advantages over the moving
clamshell BSPS. The unit does not break down as often
or require as much maintenance as the moving unit,
reducing the warranty costs to Frigoscandia Equipment
(Brodziak, 2002). This additional reliability is a benefit
to customers as well: it facilitates use of the BSPS-SC
system as a control measure in a plant’s PR/HACCP
system. Control measures must be reliable because the
whole slaughter line must stop production if any of the
critical control points in the PR/HACCP system are not
functioning correctly. The BSPS-SC unit is reliable
enough to use as a critical control measure. 
Another benefit to beefpacking plants with the BSPS-
SC was a reduction in operating costs because the
steam part of the tunnel can be kept at a constant high
temperature (Leising, 2002). In the moving unit, all
three processes were conducted in the same chamber
with the temperature fluctuating between the hot steam
and the cold water wash, resulting in greater costs to
bring the steam chamber up to its desired temperature. 
The fourth and final invention was a change in the
entrance and exit doors. Instead of two large doors, the
doors were subdivided on each side into two-foot long
segments, or eight doors on each end of the BSPS-SC.
With this modification, the uneven-sized sides of beef
enter the chamber with only the relevant doors being
opened. As a result, the doors remain open less time
with the static version. As a result, the vacuum seal is
more easily maintained, the amount of steam needed
was reduced, and the reliability of the equipment was
further improved. In February 1999, Wilson
(Frigoscandia Equipment), Leising (Excel), and other
Frigoscandia Equipment inventors applied for a patent
on the improved doors (U.S. Patent, 2000). 
The Innovating Collaborators
Appropriated a Variety of Benefits
The three collaborators for the BSPS-SC invention,
Frigoscandia Equipment, Excel, and KSU, contributed
in different ways to the development of the
technology—and benefited differently. Frigoscandia
Equipment, through Craig Wilson, initiated the innova-
tion and contributed technical and administrative
expertise. The costs to Frigoscandia Equipment of
designing, building, and testing the BSPS prototype
and the moving clamshell BSPS unit was $1.2 million
spread over 3 years, mid-1994 to mid-1997 (Brodziak,
2001 and 2002). These costs were in-house labor and
other variable costs, including contracting costs to the
machine shop that produced the parts for the proto-
types. The BSPS-SC modification took Frigoscandia
Equipment 9 months and $100,000 to design and build.
Frigoscandia Equipment’s total investment was $1.3
million for the BSPS-SC innovation.
The two largest U.S. beefpacking companies, Excel
and IBP, bought the equipment for all of their slaugh-
terplants. Frigoscandia Equipment earned a small
profit on the BSPS-SC equipment sales and the instal-
lation (Brodziak, 2001 and 2002). From 1996-2001,
Frigoscandia Equipment sold 28 BSPS-SC units: 20
large and 8 smaller units. Smaller units were sold at
approximately $250,000 each, depending on site-spe-
cific requirements. 
Excel’s contribution included paying for the beef used
in the testing and all plant operation costs during the
testing at the Excel’s Sterling and Fort Morgan plants.
Excel also invested a considerable amount of resources
in adjustments and adaptations to the unit, including
engineering maintenance. Excel recouped some of
these expenses because it was not charged for the first
moving clamshell BSPS unit and adjustments were
made in the purchase price of other BSPS units to
compensate for Excel’s investment. Excel also bene-
fited by taking advantage of its “first right of refusal”
and being the first U.S. company to install the BSPS
and BSPS-SC in all its packing plants (Cargill, 1997).
This gave them a “first mover” advantage (Porter,
1998), namely, an enhanced reputation as a leader in
food safety research and development that led to an
increase in beef sales and contracts.
KSU was brought into the development team to conduct
a wide variety of microbiologial tests on pathogens and
indicator organisms using four different pieces of equip-
ment, using different testing procedures, and using dif-
ferent combinations of steam temperature/time in the
BSPS units. KSU contributed the time of two Ph.D. stu-
dents and one professor to the project. Most of the test-
ing equipment was purchased by Frigoscandia
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$50,000 worth of testing kits and other supplies. 
All three collaborators boosted their food safety repu-
tation through their involvement in the innovation.
Frigoscandia Equipment strengthened its position in
the food safety equipment industry. Excel became
known as a food safety leader and gained market share
in the beefpacking business (Leising, 2002). KSU
became known for its expertise in microbial food
safety (Leising, 2002). Two KSU students earned doc-
torates doing microbiological research on the BSPS
technology. KSU now grants distance-learning degrees
in Food Science and this program has been recognized
for its quality by the Institute of Food Technologists
(Phebus, 2002).
The BSPS-SC:Three Years to
Technological Innovation and 
Market Acceptance 
A review of the history of the BSPS-SC technology
reveals that numerous factors led to the successful
development and commercialization of the technology,
including outbreaks and recalls, patent protection,
technical expertise, industry contacts, and government
regulations. The 1993 E. coli O157:H7 outbreak sup-
plied the initial push for the innovation, driving
Frigoscandia Equipment and Excel to pursue the tech-
nology (Cargill, 1997). In August 1997, another out-
break of E. coli O157:H7 in hamburger occurred, and
the Hudson Foods Company recalled 25 million
pounds of contaminated beef, closed the plant for
cleaning, and finally sold the plant because sales con-
tracts were canceled. This outbreak convinced IBP, the
largest U.S. beefpacking company, to purchase the
BSPS equipment for all its slaughterhouses. 
Patents played a critical role in protecting the appro-
priability of the innovation. To keep competitors from
copying the design of the BSPS-SC, four patents were
issued to Frigoscandia Equipment. The first patent, on
the prototype tested at KSU, was a concept patent and
was filed early in the innovation process, 1994, to act
as a place-holder for patent protection for more devel-
oped designs (Wilson and Leising, 1994). The BSPS-
SC invention was protected by three more patents on
the more complex and complete designs: moving
clamshell unit, static chamber model, and static cham-
ber with improved entrance and exit doors (U.S.
Patent, 1998, 1999, 2000).
Technical expertise and personal contacts also played
critical roles in the development of the innovation.
Frigoscandia Equipment had a 50-year history in mak-
ing chilling and freezing equipment for the beef indus-
try. The BSPS-SC used pieces of the monitoring
equipment from these chillers and freezers in building
the monitoring equipment for the BSPS. Craig Wilson,
director of special projects for the U.S. office of
Frigoscandia Equipment, played the pivotal role in
conceptualizing the invention, building the prototype,
and designing the commercial scale-up. His profes-
sional and personal relationship with Dr. Leising
helped forge the links in the agreement between
Frigoscandia Equipment and Excel that led to the risk-
sharing and knowledge-sharing and culminated in the
successful BSPS innovation. KSU played a critical
role in testing different BSPS models at a variety of
time/temperature combinations. These data from an
academic and independent source were critical for
USDA approval and important for the beef industry to
understand the relationships among pathogen reduc-
tion levels, steam temperature, and the duration of
steam application.
U.S. government certification in 1995 that BSPS signifi-
cantly reduces pathogens lessened the uncertainty fac-
ing industry purchasers regarding the efficacy of the
technology and opened the door for use of the BSPS as
a critical control point in PR/HACCP (Cargill, 1995;
USDA, 2002). In addition, a number of government
guidelines have explicitly endorsed the use of the tech-
nology. For example, in 2000, USDA’s Agricultural
Marketing Service specified that suppliers of beef trim
and ground bison to Agency-administered purchasing
programs, such as the school lunch program, must
include an anti-microbial intervention as a critical con-
trol point (CCP) in the establishment’s HACCP plan.
“The CCP must be one of the following processes:
steam pasteurization; an organic acid rinse; or 180o F
hot water wash” (USDA, 2000). 
The BSPS-SC innovation has enjoyed great market
success in the United States. Excel, the second-largest
U.S. beefpacking company, installed the technology in
all seven of its beefpacking plants by June 1997. IBP,
Inc., the largest beefpacking company, installed BSPS-
SC equipment in all its beef slaughterhouses. (In 2001,
IBP was purchased by Tyson Foods, Inc., and Tyson
became the world’s largest marketer of beef, pork, and
chicken.) Costco requires all of its beef suppliers to
use the Frigoscandia Equipment BSPS-SC in the
slaughterhouse.
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beef-product recall insurance policy available through
the American Meat Institute, the meat industry’s
largest trade association. This recall insurance, which
is sold by MacDougall Risk Management, offers the
possibility of reduced rates and higher likelihood of
coverage for plants that have installed the BSPS-SC
(MacDougall, 2002). Other insurance programs cover-
ing product quality or safety are also sensitive to base-
line plant risks and safety investments. 
Despite the major marketing accomplishments in the
United States, the BSPS-SC technology has yet to
become standard practice in the beef industry outside of
North America. One explanation for this result could lie
in the difficulty of successfully integrating even the
most reliable technology into a plant’s pathogen control
system (Bisaillon et al., 1997; Powell et al., 2001). Part
of the skill in using any new pathogen-reduction tech-
nology is integrating it in the whole production system.
For example, the effectiveness of the BSPS-SC, may be
compromised if the carcasses are not chilled fast
enough or are improperly spaced. Improper spacing of
carcasses allows touching in the chiller and results in
compromising both the temperature reduction and the
rate of drying, creating conditions where pathogens can
multiply (Phebus, 2002). 
Pathogen control is difficult, and the food industry has
a history of using multiple-hurdles to control food-
borne pathogens, especially since pathogens can
recover from a “kill-step” and grow back (unlike
chemical or material contaminates) (Morris, 1999).
Key factors in pathogen control in a beef slaughter
plant include whether pathogens enter the plant on the
hides and in the gastrointestinal tract of incoming cat-
tle, whether hide removal or evisceration contaminate
the carcass after killing, whether steam pasteurization
and other kill steps are effectively administered, and
proper spacing and temperature reduction in the
chiller. The combination of all these events determines
the probability of pathogen-free status for carcasses as
they enter the fabrication room (Roberts, Malcolm,
and Narrod, 1999; USDA, 2001; Sofos et al., 1999;
Roberts, Narrod, Malcolm, and Modarres, 2001).
The benefits of any pathogen-reduction system are
also difficult to measure on an ongoing basis, since
constant monitoring and microbial testing are required.
There is great variability in the pathogen load that the
individual cattle bring into the plant, there is variabil-
ity among workers and their practices, and different
firms may use different steam times and temperatures.
Pathogen testing is required to assure the BSPS-SC is
as effective “as planned.” The benefits of the BSPS-
SC technology can also be reduced if the appropriate
level of control is not maintained at all subsequent key
processing stages in the plant. Because the efficacy of
the technology is judged within the context of a plant’s
whole safety system, the dependability of the technol-
ogy could vary greatly from plant to plant, depending
on the characteristics of each plant’s safety system.
This fact complicates the task of developing and mar-
keting food safety technologies—and the task of prov-
ing and maintaining their efficacy on a daily basis. 
The series of tests that Frigoscandia Equipment and
Excel funded prior to marketing the BSPS was neces-
sary to gain U.S. regulatory acceptance and market
acceptance by the two largest U.S. beefpacking com-
panies. Nevertheless, even this level of testing has so
far been unable to convince European companies to
purchase the BSPS-SC. In addition, the technology has
not been adopted by other slaughter industries: to date
no U.S. hog slaughter companies have purchased the
BSPS-SC system for pork carcasses. Future market
penetration of the BSPS-SC technology, both domesti-
cally and internationally, hinges on the proven depend-
ability of the technology and its role in the process
control systems of the future. 
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United States, begins working with the U.S. meat
industry on freezing. 
Jan. 1993: A foodborne disease outbreak in the
Western States is associated with E. coli O157:H7 in
hamburgers from Jack in the Box. 
Late 1993/early 1994: Craig Wilson, in charge of
special projects at Frigoscandia Equipment (Bellevue,
WA) discusses with other Frigoscandia engineers
how to prevent such outbreaks. Steam pasteurization
of beef carcasses is suggested as a technically viable
option. Wilson calls his professional friend Jerry
Leising, Excel Vice President and Director of
Research and Development, who offers to collaborate
in inventing and testing equipment to use steam to
pasteurize the surface of beef carcasses.
Early 1994: Frigoscandia designs and builds a small
prototype to assure that E. coli O157:H7 on beef can
be killed with steam. Informal talks with meat and
poultry companies reveal that beef companies are the
most interested in steam pasteurization equipment.
Nov. 7, 1994: Wilson (Frigoscandia Equipment) and
Leising (Excel) apply for a patent, “Method and appa-
ratus for steam pasteurization of meats,” U.S. Pat.
Appl. 08/335,437. Frigoscandia Equipment is the
assignee on the patent.
1994: Kansas State University (KSU) is included as
part of the development team. Frigoscandia’s proto-
type moves to KSU and tests begin on beef carcasses.
1995: Larger moving clamshell BSPS unit pieces are
manufactured by subcontractors and assembled/installed
by Frigoscandia engineers in an Excel plant in Sterling,
Colorado. 
Nov. 6, 1995: Patent application is filed by Wilson
(Frigoscandia Equipment) Leising (Excel) and other
Frigoscandia inventors for a larger moving clamshell
BSPS unit. Frigoscandia Equipment is the assignee on
the patent.
Dec. 1995: USDA approves the BSPS process for
killing pathogens on the surface of beef carcasses.
1996: FMC FoodTech, a Chicago-based firm with 100
years of experience in food technology, buys
Frigoscandia Equipment.
June 1, 1997: Excel announces that Frigoscandia’s
BSPS has been installed in all its North American beef
plants. 
Aug. 1997: FSIS requests the recall of ground beef
for contamination with E. coli O157:H7 at Hudson
Foods. The recall is very large, because contaminated
meat from one day is mixed in with the next day’s pro-
duction.
Aug. 1997: IBP, Inc. executive asks Wilson to meet
with IBP executives. IBP decides to purchase the
BSPS-SC for all its beef slaughter plants. 
Sep. 1997: USDA turns over approval of meat and
poultry equipment to NSF International, a private 
certification body.
Jan. 23, 1998: Patent application is filed by Wilson
(Frigoscandia Equipment), Leising (Excel) and other
Frigoscandia inventors for a static chamber system that
uses steam to destroy surface pathogens on meat.
Frigoscandia Equipment is the assignee on the patent.
Oct. 1998: Wilson leaves Frigoscandia Equipment
and becomes Costco’s assistant Vice President for food
safety and technology in Issaquah, Washington. 
Feb. 26, 1999: Patent application is filed by Wilson
(Frigoscandia Equipment), Leising (Excel) and other
Frigoscandia inventors for apparatus for steam pasteur-
ization of food. The unique element is the improved
entrance and exit door structures to the static chamber.
Eight doors, each 2 feet tall on each side, move when
touched by the side of beef, and the vacuum seal is
better maintained in the system. Frigoscandia
Equipment is the assignee on the patent.
2002: Costco and other buyers stipulate that beef sup-
plies must come from a plant using the Frigoscandia
Equipment’s BSPS-SC system at an appropriate time
and temperature (Wilson, 11/4/02).
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Appendix A: Time Line for Beef Steam Pasteurization System InnovationMicrobial pathogen control in hamburger patty pro-
duction poses several challenges. Grinding operations
typically take raw beef trimmings from multiple
sources and mix these inputs together to make patties.
Meat trimmings may carry high pathogen loads
because of how they have been handled and because
they have multiple exposed surfaces. The grinding
operation itself disperses any pathogens present on the
trimmings throughout the ground product, and there is
opportunity for those pathogens to multiply in the sub-
sequent supply chain. Designing testing protocols for
detecting sporadic pathogen loads in high volumes of
product is a challenge, as is getting quick results on
which to base management decisions.
This case study focuses on the development of the
Bacterial Pathogen Sampling and Testing Program by
the Texas American Foodservice Corporation (Texas
American) in collaboration with four other entities: the
Jack in the Box restaurant chain, one of Texas
American’s major customers; Qualicon, a unit of
DuPont Company; the Public Health and Science Office
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety
and Inspection Service; and the National Cattlemen’s
Beef Association.1 The story of the Bacterial Pathogen
Sampling and Testing Program is one of a series of fac-
tors coming together at one time. These included a
demand for increased pathogen control by a major
buyer of hamburger patties, the competitive interest of
the supplier in building a reputation for quality control,
and the technological opportunity afforded by the inter-
est of an input supplier in adapting its improved testing
technologies to the food industry. The outcome was a
significant food safety innovation.
The Bacterial Pathogen Sampling and Testing Program
is a process innovation combining a new sampling
protocol/management system for E. coli O157:H7,
Listeria monocytogenes, and Salmonella sp. and a new
application of a patented testing technology to ham-
burger patty processing lines. The process innovation
has resulted in a product innovation: hamburger patties
with consistently low levels of pathogen contamina-
tion. This case study sheds particular light on the
nature of appropriability for process innovations aimed
at improving the safety of food products. It also sheds
light on the set of incentives generated in the supply
chain when operational change is necessary to assure a
higher and more reliable level of food safety.
The 1993 E. coli O157:H7 Outbreak
Catalyzed Changes at Texas American
Foodservice
Texas American is a unit of the American Foodservice
Corporation, a privately owned company that operates
three plants in the United States (table D-1 presents
background on the general characteristics of Texas
American). American Foodservice Corporation is one
of the largest independent ground beef producers in
the United States. The main product of Texas
American is frozen hamburger patties, supplied mostly
to national and regional fast food companies, such as
Jack in the Box. At the time of the 2001 interview,
Texas American had 430 employees and processed 150
million pounds of ground beef annually, all of which
was sold within the United States. 
When Texas American began producing hamburger
patties in the mid-1980s, there was no significant pub-
licity or regulatory policy around ground beef and
microbial food safety risk. Nevertheless, in the early
1990s, it began to focus on the effects of improving
quality control and food safety. These effects included
improving external failures (product rejections, prod-
uct returns, liability, threatened loss of supply con-
tracts, and a threatened increase in USDA inspection
oversight), as well as internal process failures that
resulted in product losses. 
In 1992, Texas American hired a leading expert on qual-
ity control, Timothy Biela, to assist it in the redesign of
its pathogen control system. Shortly thereafter it began
investigating clinical microbiological testing technolo-
gies, such as Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) testing,
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Innovation for Microbial Pathogen Control in the 
Supply Chain for Hamburger Patties
Elisabete Salay, Julie A. Caswell, and Tanya Roberts
1 Information on this innovation was obtained in interviews with
Timothy Biela (Texas American Foodservice) in 2001 and 2002
and with Dr. David Theno (Jack in the Box) in 2001 and 2002.
(For survey format see Salay et al., 2003.)that could be adapted for use in monitoring pathogens
in the hamburger supply chain. 
The need for better pathogen control in the hamburger
patty supply chain was brought to widespread attention
in the United States by the 1993 Jack in the Box food-
borne illness outbreak associated with inadequate cook-
ing of hamburger patties that were contaminated with E.
coli O157:H7 (see box “Pathogen Reduction and
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point Program,”
p. 15). In the wake of the 1993 outbreak, Jack in the
Box instituted quality control programs reaching over
all aspects of company operations from procurement
through in-store cooking and handling to the consumer.
First, the company hired a new manager with food
safety experience in the poultry industry, Dr. David
Theno, to head its safety program. Next, the company
suspended all existing contracts with hamburger patty
suppliers and designed new contract specifications.
Only two companies, one of them Texas American, met
the demands of the new contracts. 
Texas American was in a good position to respond to
the call from Jack in the Box for producers who could
supply hamburger patties that met strict quality stan-
dards. It was able to move quickly after the 1993 out-
break because it had already begun developing a new
systematic approach to pathogen control and had
begun investigation of testing methodologies. 
Development of New Sampling and
Testing Protocols:
Innovation Through Collaboration
The Bacterial Pathogen Sampling and Testing Program
is a process innovation combining two parts: a new
sampling protocol/management system and the new
application of a patented testing technology to ham-
burger patty processing lines. Safety in the Texas
American program is controlled through strict testing
to assure that standards are met in raw materials, in
bulk product coming out of the grinder, and in finished
patty products. Though Texas American maintains
strict temperature control and cleaning regimes within
the plant, it does not include a kill step, such as steam
pasteurization or irradiation, in its production lines.
The key critical control point in its safety system is the
quality and temperature of raw materials coming into
the grinding plant (most of the actual activities neces-
sary to reduce pathogen loads occur in the plants of
the raw material suppliers). 
The successful development of the Bacterial Pathogen
Sampling and Testing Program hinged on the develop-
ment of a well-targeted sampling protocol and a good
testing technology (see box, “Texas American
Foodservice Corporation Bacterial Pathogen Sampling
and Testing Program” for the major elements of the
innovation and the appendix to this chapter for an
overall timeline for the development of the innova-
tion). Sampling protocols are of great importance to
the management of pathogen risk because testing
every product is not economically feasible, particularly
since the pathogens of interest tend to be sporadic and
at a low level (Pruett et al., 2002). 
The Texas American sampling protocol is designed to
manage risk to an acceptably low level. Trimmings
entering the plant are sampled based on type, supplier,
and supplier performance but not less than every
100,000 pounds, which for most raw material suppliers
is daily. If lots test higher than standards, the supplier
is notified immediately and testing is intensified. All
raw materials are routinely screened for Aerobic Plate
Counts (APC), generic coliforms, generic E. coli,
Staphylococcus aureus, Salmonella, and Listeria
monocytogenes. These routine test results are reported
to suppliers and reviewed with them monthly. 
Samples are next taken at the final grind head, where
each batch of 3,000 pounds of hamburger is tested for
E. coli O157:H7. Finally, samples of the finished prod-
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Table D-1—General characteristics of Texas American
Foodservice Corporation, 2001
Main activity Ground meat producer, two facilities in
Fort Worth, Texas
Main products Ground beef, 150 million pounds annually 
Number of  430 employees (under USDA FSIS 
employees classifications, this is a small (< 500 
employees) operation)
Main market  85% of production is frozen patties for 
segment commercial fast food, other markets 
include casual dining, retail, and wholesale
Exports No exports
Parent Company: 5 plants in the United States with total
American Foodservice  production of 280 million pounds of 
Corporation ground beef annually
Ownership Privately owned corporationuct are taken from each process line every 15 minutes.
Every hour, composites of the four samples are tested
to detect E. coli O157:H7. These samples are also
combined to make a “half-shift” composite, which is
tested for an entire microbial profile (APC, coliform,
E. coli, Staphylococcus aureus, Salmonella sp., and
Listeria monocytogenes). If the half-shift composites
show spikes or high counts, more tests are run on the
backup samples, also collected every 15 minutes. At
all testing points, action levels and actions to be taken
if deviations occur are clearly defined.
The development of a good testing technology was as
important as the sampling protocol to the success of
the Bacterial Pathogen Sampling and Testing Program.
Texas American believed that no one truly understood
the incidence of contamination of beef with pathogens
and that traditional microbiological testing methods
were inadequate because they relied on culturing sam-
ples of meat, were not very sensitive, took time to run,
and were not well defined for these organisms. Texas
American started its quest for a new testing methodol-
ogy by upgrading its own microbiology lab and inves-
tigating the availability of human clinical
microbiological testing technologies that could be
adapted for use in monitoring pathogens in the ham-
burger supply chain. It eventually settled on
Qualicon’s BAX™ detection system, which uses
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) technology to test
for E. coli O157:H7 and other pathogens. The PCR
technology allows users to target known DNA strands
from specific organisms and is capable of detecting the
target organisms at levels much lower than standard
serological (cultural) methods. 
The BAX™ technology was being used to detect
human illness, but had not been used to detect
pathogens in a food production setting. The applica-
tion of the BAX™ test to food processing required
Texas American to conduct experiments to assure that
the tests performed as expected in the new setting.
This need was an important motivation for Texas
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Texas American Foodservice Corporation Bacterial Pathogen Sampling and Testing Program 
(and description of additional quality control procedures)
Element of Protocol
Temperature monitoring of incoming combo bins (2,000
lbs.) of beef trim; reject if temperature is above 40oF
Combo bins sampled based on type, supplier, and sup-
plier performance record; sampled not less than every
100,000 lbs.; most raw material lots sampled daily
Test results given to supplier monthly for all lots tested; if
lots test higher than standards, supplier is notified immedi-
ately and testing is intensified, monthly review of supplier
performance on microbiological criteria and in-plant audits
to assess compliance with Texas American standards with
performance compared to that of other suppliers
Temperature control (40oF) and inventory management
system for combo bins, first-in-first-out, use by 5th day
after boning
Samples are taken at the final grind head for each 
3,000-lb batch of hamburger tested for E. coli O157:H7
Samples of finished products are taken from each
process line every half-hour; half-hour samples are com-
bined into "half shift" composites representing every 4
hours of production, tested for complete microbial pro-
file (APC, coliform, E. coli, Staphylococcus aureus,
Salmonella sp., and Listeria monocytogenes), individual
backup samples for each half hour are tested only if
composites show spikes or high counts
Rework procedures in place, internal failures (e.g., the
patty does not meet specifications) are continuously
reworked during the day with quantity of rework
recorded for each batch, end of day rework is only used
during the last hour of production on the next day (seg-
regated by product), at end of week all remaining rework
is destroyed
In-plant cleaning regime in continuous operation,
monthly random pre-operational swab tests to verify the
efficacy of cleaning procedures and monitor the environ-
ment for pathogens
Temperature control (less than 10oF) for frozen patties
Continuous review of procedures and results; adjustment
of operating procedures to address problems and oppor-
tunities for improvementAmerican to engage in cooperative and collaborative
arrangements in developing the program. For its part,
Qualicon needed a partner to help validate the use of
the PCR/DNA Bacterial Testing equipment and meth-
ods for meat products. 
To properly validate and sell the efficacy of the tech-
nology, Texas American also solicited the involvement
of several other groups. Until this time, there was sig-
nificant speculation about the sensitivity of the
PCR/DNA method and resistance to its use. It was also
not well understood how organisms contained in food
products (meat) reacted in typical grinding operations,
for example, how they moved and the level of transfer
from contaminated to non-contaminated meat. The val-
idation collaboration involved parallel testing, using
different methods, of a number of samples by Texas
American by Silliker Laboratories (the largest inde-
pendent commercial testing lab in the United States)
and by USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service
(FSIS), through its Office of Public Health & Science
(Pruett et al., 2002). Texas American funded its techni-
cians, the microbiological assays, and data analysis.
The National Cattlemen’s Beef Association funded the
testing by Silliker Laboratories. FSIS funded testing at
FSIS labs. 
Jack in the Box played an active role throughout the
development of the Bacterial Pathogen Sampling and
Testing innovation. Since Texas American sells
unbranded product in intermediate markets, it must tai-
lor its product to the specifications of its major poten-
tial customers such as Jack in the Box. When Texas
American became a supplier, Jack in the Box was
looking for partners who could work with it to over-
come the limits of microbial pathogen control. Jack in
the Box established standards and was involved in
monitoring the quality of raw material suppliers and
specifying plants approved to supply to grinding oper-
ations producing hamburger patties for sale to Jack in
the Box (Jack in the Box signs essentially cost-plus
contracts with its patty producers that cover the costs
of quality control). The result was a close collabora-
tion that evolved over time as both parties learned
more about the systems required to assure food safety. 
Interestingly, government regulation was not an obvi-
ous driver in the development of the innovation. In
fact, though some USDA regulation was a stimulant to
better management of risks, Texas American often
found itself in the position of sharing its superior
information with regulators or driving collaboration
with FSIS. Regulatory and consumer developments in
other countries were also not drivers for innovation by
Texas American because the company sells only
within the United States. 
The successful collaboration of Texas American, Jack
in the Box, Qualicon (DuPont), FSIS, and the National
Cattlemen’s Beef Association ultimately resulted in the
Texas American Bacterial Pathogen Sampling and
Testing Program. Texas American believes that this
innovation has reduced by 80 percent the risk associ-
ated with distributing a raw product that can poten-
tially contain organisms that can cause illness or death
if consumed prior to proper cooking and preparation.
The company has never had a recall of its products
and believes that its program significantly lowers the
risk of recall or negative publicity associated with
foodborne illness outbreaks. 
Texas American Leads the Way…
and Appropriates the Benefits 
Texas American appropriated the benefits of its process
innovation through establishing a substantial lead over
its competitors. Texas American did not believe that
pursuing patents or secrecy was important to maintain-
ing or increasing the competitive advantage it would
gain from the innovation. Indeed, the collaborative
nature of the innovation process, with strong involve-
ment from Qualicon and Jack in the Box, which in turn
would be working with other suppliers, probably made
secrecy unworkable. In fact, Texas American and Jack
in the Box have been very active in sharing the new
approach with other members of the hamburger patty
supply chain. They believe that the reputation of the
entire industry, including their own, is on the line any-
time poor quality control results in illnesses and out-
breaks associated with hamburger products. Texas
American’s stance is to share its knowledge about the
implications of organisms like E. coli O157:H7 with
potential customers as well as with competitors. 
The Texas American experience supports the idea that
transparency of an innovation does not necessarily
imply that it will be widely imitated. The complexity
of the management systems and the discipline they
require, along with continued innovative activity, have
helped Texas American build and maintain a competi-
tive advantage. In addition, given current market con-
ditions, the costs of adoption are high relative to
opportunities to market improved pathogen control. 
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tained through the fact that it captured a significant
share of the market for hamburger patties produced to
a higher pathogen control standard. Its dominant posi-
tion may discourage other firms. However, this could
change if demand for higher quality control standards
becomes more widespread among buyers.
Texas American has been able to reap numerous bene-
fits from its food safety innovation—and its first-mover
advantage. One of the major benefits is that Texas
American has been able to shift from being a commod-
ity producer selling on a week-to-week basis to being a
contract supplier. This shift has allowed Texas American
to improve its operational efficiency through better
planning for capacity utilization, capital investment,
spending plans, and other business activities. 
Another benefit of the innovation is Texas American’s
ability to use its superior knowledge and expertise in
the area of pathogen control to attract new customers.
Texas American has enhanced its reputation with qual-
ity control, superior knowledge, and risk management
skills it has built over a period of almost a decade. The
company’s sales increased approximately 5 percent
annually after it implemented the innovation. Over the
3 years up to 2001, Texas American estimates that
about 25-30 percent of its new sales opportunities
occurred because of the innovation. The increase in
sales has had the added important benefit of allowing
Texas American to increase its utilization of fixed cap-
ital by 20 percent over the last 5 years. 
Texas American also attributes significant savings and
other financial benefits to adoption of the program.
The superior knowledge about incidence rates and
potential for product contamination that Texas
American has gained through the program has enabled
it to make better risk-management decisions regarding
suppliers of raw materials. Texas American’s under-
standing of which raw material suppliers have higher
incidence levels and at what times of the year to
expect positive test readings in different types of raw
materials allows it to make better purchasing deci-
sions. Avoiding high-risk raw materials leads to fewer
product rejections and helps save money. Thanks to
the Bacterial Pathogen Sampling and Testing Program,
Texas American has been experiencing very few con-
tamination incidents per year for E. coli O157:H7; in
some years it has had none or one. 
The benefits of the Bacterial Pathogen Sampling and
Testing Program to Texas American have outweighed
the costs of the innovation even though the costs of
instituting the program involved significant initial
expenditures. Texas American characterized the startup
expenses as very high. In addition, there were high
costs related to destruction of product in the early
stages of the implementation. To contain some of these
costs, Texas American worked with USDA to get
approval of a system to identify sub-lots for purposes
of testing and recall. Over time, costs have not
increased, even though testing technology has become
increasingly sensitive. 
Texas American reports that costs are being controlled
due to several factors. First, the development of the sub-
lot system has reduced the amount of product that needs
to be removed by pinpointing product that is contami-
nated. Second, the raw materials industry has reduced
microbial contamination rates for incoming product
under the Texas American program, since Texas
American works with its suppliers to reduce contamina-
tion and the performance of the industry has generally
been improving. Finally, Texas American has set a rea-
sonable threshold level for the BAX™ tests of its fin-
ished, frozen hamburger patties. Texas American set the
threshold level for product rejection to eliminate the pos-
sibility of outbreak and massive recall. The most sensi-
tive BAX™ test for ground meat is extremely sensitive; it
is able to detect 1 cell/125 grams of product. Using the
lower bound of such a sensitive test could result in rejec-
tion of as much as 30-65 percent of product depending
on the geographical source and time of year.
Current costs of the program are minimal now that the
innovation has been in place for a period of years.
Texas American estimates that the cost per pound of
the system runs between $0.001 and $0.01, without
significant increases in labor, raw material consump-
tion, or energy consumption. To maintain a competi-
tive edge, and its name as a food safety leader, Texas
American continues to expend capital on research and
development, with the bulk of these expenditures
going to food safety improvements. 
An Emerging Market for Food Safety
Opens the Door to Food Safety Innovation 
The Texas American case study illustrates the impact
that the emergence of a market for food safety can
have on the appropriability of food safety
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Texas American case study, Jack in the Box, a highly
knowledgeable buyer with the ability to test for and
verify safety attributes helped spur the development of
the market for food safety attributes. Jack in the Box,
and a number of other fast food and restaurant compa-
nies, have a great deal staked on the continued good
reputation of their brand names. Particularly since the
1993 E. coli O157:H7 outbreak, these companies have
had strong incentives to expend the resources neces-
sary to control for food safety. They also typically deal
with a very small number of suppliers and maintain
traceability systems that allow them to track the source
of any problems. Thus the failures usually thought to
exist in markets for food safety are mitigated to a sig-
nificant extent by the nature of the supply chain for
hamburger patties used in chain restaurants. 
The development of demand for food safety in this
market, in response to the need to manage risk, in turn
increased the probability that a company that invested
in innovation for food safety control would be able to
appropriate benefits from that investment. For Texas
American, the push by Jack in the Box to find high-
quality hamburger patty suppliers offered the opportu-
nity to intensify the company’s new commitment to
quality assurance with substantial certainty that its
efforts would be rewarded with sales at prices that
would recognize the company’s quality achievements. 
Texas American and Jack in the Box worked collabo-
ratively over time to attain higher standards. Both
companies were first motivated by the need for risk
management to limit or eliminate the damage in repu-
tation, sales, and liability stemming from inadequate
quality control. Both companies have found that a rep-
utation for quality has served as a foundation for
growth. These companies have helped develop a mar-
ket for food safety—and through their reputations as
safety leaders, both have reaped benefits from supply-
ing this market.
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production.
Early 1990s: Texas American becomes concerned
about quality control and begins exploring new meth-
ods to improve quality assurance.
Mar. 1992: Timothy Biela, Director of Quality
Assurance, conducts hazard analysis for bacterial,
physical, and chemical hazards for Texas American
hamburger patties.
Early 1993: Jack in the Box E. coli O157:H7 
outbreak.
Mar. 1993: Biela and Texas American General
Manager schedule meeting with Jack in the Box to
discuss a strategy and program for supplying frozen
hamburger patties to Jack in the Box.
Mar.-Apr. 1993: Contract negotiated with testing
details and responsibilities for affected products speci-
fied in the contract.
May 1993: Texas American starts supplying Jack in
the Box. 
May 1993-1994: Texas American upgrades microbi-
ology lab, writes specific operation procedures, devel-
ops new sampling and testing protocols, acquires
equipment from Qualicon and other suppliers.
1993-1994:  Validation of Qualicon testing protocols.
1994-Present: Continued refinement of sampling and
testing program.
2000: Begins joint venture into retailing Modified
Atmosphere Packing of ground beef products.
2001: Texas American opens a second plant in Texas. 
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Appendix B: Time Line for the 
Texas American Foodservice Corporation InnovationMarket Incentives for Food Safety
Innovation: Lessons from the 
Meat Industry 
The ERS survey and the two case studies illustrate how
the meat processing industry has developed mechanisms
for partially overcoming the incentive problems caused
by asymmetric information in food safety markets. In
this section, we identify and discuss eight primary driv-
ers of food safety innovation in the meat industry, as
revealed by the survey and case studies. 
Emerging Markets for Food Safety 
Overcome Market Failure 
By far, the dominant drivers of food safety innovation
in the meat industry are the stringent requirements on
product safety and quality demanded by large fast
food restaurants, such as Burger King, Jack in the
Box, McDonald’s, and Wendy’s. By demanding safer
products from their suppliers, these restaurants have
successfully created markets for food safety. The suc-
cess of these markets rests on the ability of these large
buyers to enforce standards through testing and
process audits—and to reward suppliers who meet
safety standards and punish those who do not.
Through contracts with these large buyers, meat
processors are able to appropriate the benefits of their
investments in food safety. 
The emergence of savvy buyers who demand quality
alleviates two market failure problems that typically
occur in markets for food safety. The first problem
characterizing most food markets is that demand for
product differentiation on the basis of safety is typi-
cally episodic because consumers are largely unin-
formed about food safety. The large fast food
restaurants reverse this trend; they are anything but
uninformed. To protect their investments in brand
equity, these restaurants have become educated about
food safety processes and testing. They are pushing
food suppliers to provide safer products—something
that typical food consumers rarely do. 
The second market failure problem, that of asymmetric
information, is also alleviated by the emergence of
demanding large buyers. In typical food markets, pro-
ducers who use the safest processes and produce the
safest products have a difficult time differentiating
themselves from their less safe competitors, since most
buyers cannot tell the difference between safe and
unsafe product. Because large retailers have the capa-
bility to test or otherwise verify safety, food processors
that use safe processes can differentiate themselves
from their competitors and seek compensation for
higher quality products. Thanks to the emergence of
these technically proficient buyers, safer meat proces-
sors can appropriate some of the benefits of their
investments in safety through price premiums or guar-
anteed sales. 
In the market for hamburger, fast food restaurants have
adopted the role of channel captains, monitoring the
safety of products up and down the supply chain. They
have created markets for food safety that have stimu-
lated demand for safety and provided processors with
mechanisms for appropriating the benefits of food
safety innovation. Slaughter plants subject to buyer
specifications invest in more food safety activities than
those without buyer specifications. 
The experiences of Texas American/Jack in the Box
and Frigoscandia Equipment/Excel illustrate the
advantages of a market for food safety. These compa-
nies gained reputations for safety and benefited from
increased demand and market stability. As pointed out
in the Texas American case study, the fact that there
are so many advantages to creating markets for food
safety raises the question of why markets for food
safety have not developed as quickly in other parts of
the food industry. In particular, though some grocery
stores are beginning to monitor the safety practices of
their suppliers, why have food retailers generally not
adopted the same channel captain role as restaurant
chains in overseeing the quality of hamburger sold
through their outlets? Why have food retailers not been
as aggressive in demanding safer inputs? Maybe the
real question is: What prompted the large fast food
restaurants to break ranks with other retailers and
begin to demand safer inputs? 
Branding to Appropriate Benefits 
from Food Safety Innovation
Branding also plays an important role in helping firms
appropriate the benefits of safety investments. Though
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Part III. Market and Regulatory Incentives for Food Safety
Innovationthe ERS survey did not reveal more safety investment
by branded slaughter plants, this result is probably
explained by the fact that many respondents misunder-
stood the branding question. A better indicator of the
importance of branding for food safety innovation is
the key role that the major name brand fast food
restaurants have had in driving safety innovation. As
discussed above, these companies have emerged as
savvy food safety consumers and have succeeded in
stimulating food safety innovation. 
The major, name-brand fast food restaurants are able
to appropriate some of the benefits of their investments
in food safety because of their reputations for safe
food. Even more important, perhaps, these firms bene-
fit from their investments through a reduced risk of
being associated with a foodborne illness outbreak. A
firm that is identified as being responsible for a food-
borne illness outbreak faces the potential for bad pub-
licity, liability, and recalls. A food safety outbreak
could cost the firm in terms of market share, equity
value, and legal liability. As previously mentioned, in
the 18 months after the 1993 outbreak of E. coli
O157:H7, Jack in the Box and its parent company,
Foodmaker, Inc., lost about $160 million (Roberts et
al., 1997).
Not only do branded firms have more equity invest-
ment at risk than unbranded firms if they are associ-
ated with an outbreak, they also have a higher
probability of being identified and held liable in the
case of food safety problems. Name brand recognition
is a double-edged sword: it allows consumers (and
regulators) to identify and reward firms that produce
high-quality, safe products, but it also increases their
chances of identifying firms that are guilty of safety
lapses. Branding reduces the chances of remaining
anonymous in case of a foodborne disease outbreak. 
The fact that the advantages of anonymity are forfeited
with branding may explain why fast food restaurant
chains, and not foodstores, have been the first to
become channel captains in the meat industry. The abil-
ity of these restaurants to remain anonymous may have
been very limited in the first place, meaning that they
had little to lose by aggressively branding their prod-
ucts. For slaughter plants, meat processors, and food-
stores, product mixing reduces the chance that the
source of a foodborne illness will be identified and that
the guilty party will be held accountable. For these
firms, the value of remaining anonymous may be larger
than the value of branding and channel captaining. 
In addition, since restaurants have final responsibility
for meat preparation, they bear final responsibility for
proper meat handling and cooking. They are clearly
liable if food is improperly prepared, while such liabil-
ity is less clear cut in the case of slaughter plants or
processors. The added risk of liability is likely another
factor driving more and more restaurants to shoulder
the role of channel captains. 
In fact, only a limited number of input providers or
retailers have chosen to brand and to become channel
captains. For example, few if any U.S. food retailers
engage in premium or luxury house branding of meats.
With this approach, retailers attempt to build a name
for quality and safety that umbrellas all of the store-
branded products—including their branded meat prod-
ucts. Surprisingly, European retailers have been using
this strategy for some time with great success. For
example, as early as 1992, supermarket chains’ brands
accounted for about 50 percent of sales in the United
Kingdom (Selame and Kolligian, 1992). In the United
Kingdom and European Union generally, grocery
stores have taken on the role of channel captain and
many developments in food safety management on
that side of the Atlantic can be traced to the major gro-
cery stores. The question remains as to why European
retailers find it advantageous to relinquish their
anonymity and become channel captains, while U.S.
retailers do not. 
International Trade Stimulates Demand for
Safety and Provides Technological Spillovers
International trade has played an important role in
stimulating the demand for food safety, with many for-
eign buyers playing a channel captain role in much the
same way as the large fast food restaurants. Foreign
buyers who demand high safety standards tend to test
product for safety and to pay premiums or to guaran-
tee sales for safe producers; these are the buyers who
fuel the growth of markets for food safety and stimu-
late safety innovation. The ERS survey data reveal 
that slaughter plants with foreign buyers invested in
more safety activities than those serving exclusively
domestic markets. 
The Frigoscandia Equipment case study illustrates
another potential benefit of trade in food safety: tech-
nology spillovers between countries. The development
of the Steam Pasteurization System benefited from the
technological expertise that the Swedish company had
built up over 50 years in the cold storage business.
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benefited U.S. food safety innovation. 
First Movers Appropriate the Benefits of
Innovation and Encourage Diffusion
The Texas American case study illustrates the impor-
tance of first-mover advantage in establishing a means
to appropriate the benefits of innovation. Texas
American did not patent the Bacterial Pathogen
Sampling and Testing Program or seek any other sort
of protection for the innovation. It was confident that
its first-mover advantage would forestall pressure from
the competition and provide it with space for appropri-
ating the benefits of the innovation. In fact, the com-
plexities of the Bacterial Pathogen Sampling and
Testing Program, along with continued innovative
activity, have helped Texas American build and main-
tain a competitive advantage. In addition, as a first
mover, it was able to capture a significant share of the
market for safety-controlled hamburger patties, making
entry less attractive to other firms. 
Not only did Texas American choose not to seek protec-
tion for the innovation, it actually sought to disseminate
the Bacterial Pathogen Sampling and Testing Program
throughout the industry. Jack in the Box and Texas
American have both been very active in sharing the
innovation with other members of the hamburger patty
supply chain. Both companies argue that hamburger-
borne outbreaks hurt everyone in the industry and that
anything that helps reduce the possibility of outbreaks
associated with hamburgers is good for business. 
Another reason that firms may have an interest in shar-
ing new technologies with their competitors and with
government regulators is to influence the “standard of
care” for the industry. For innovators such as
Frigoscandia Equipment, the advantage of setting the
standard of care is simple: more sales of its patented
Steam Pasteurization System. For a firm like Texas
American, which is not selling its innovation, the
advantages are subtler, though potentially as large.
Setting a standard of care that is difficult to meet can
help set a barrier to entry that benefits the innovating
firm. First adopters gain larger market shares (and
maybe market power) if the expense or complexity of
the innovation forces some producers out of business.
Even if all firms eventually adopt the innovation, first
movers will benefit from limited competition during
the period when their competitors are installing and
adapting the new technologies or processing protocols. 
Collaboration Facilitates Innovation 
and Dissemination
The observation that the performance of the industry
as a whole affects the reputation and profitability of all
firms in the industry provides incentives for firms to
collaborate to improve overall industry performance.
In both case studies, the innovative process was
dependent on collaboration. The successful collabora-
tion of Frigoscandia Equipment, Excel, and Kansas
State University led to the development of the Steam
Pasteurization System. In the case of the Bacterial
Pathogen Sampling and Testing Program, Texas
American, Jack in the Box, Qualicon, USDA-FSIS,
and the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association worked
collaboratively to develop the innovation and improve
industry performance. 
In each case, the technical and managerial expertise of
the collaborators combined to facilitate the develop-
ment of the innovation and ensure that it would be
effective in a commercial setting. Teamwork is essen-
tial to move an industry:
…innovation…requires careful, dedicated, and
enthusiastic attention to detail—to the specifics
of product and services and markets and materi-
als—by all kinds of people in the organization.
These people are not merely implementers; they
are strategists too, because any really good idea
can change a company—and an industry.”
(Mintzberg, 2002, p. 143)
In addition to technical and managerial benefits, col-
laboration also provides important risk-sharing bene-
fits. In both case studies, collaboration between buyers
like Excel and Jack in the Box and sellers like
Frigoscandia Equipment and Texas American reduced
marketing risks and provided feedback that improved
the quality and success of the innovation. In both case
studies, collaboration was essential to the willingness
of the innovators to commit time and resources to the
endeavor. Collaboration between buyers and sellers
also helps speed diffusion of the innovation. 
Market Conditions Push Large 
Firms to Innovate
The ERS survey indicates that large slaughter plants
had much higher food safety technology ratings than
smaller ones, particularly with respect to more capital-
intensive activities. For the capital-intensive activities
of equipment, testing, and careful dehiding, large
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whereas for the more labor-intensive activities of sani-
tation and operations, they had only about a 20-percent
higher rating. These differences in technology ratings
suggest that economies of scale, i.e., much lower unit
costs for large plants versus small ones, play a major
role in whether plants adopt capital-intensive food
safety technologies. However, economies of scale do
not sufficiently explain all differences. Two character-
istics peculiar to the beef industry and food safety also
explain some of the differences in food safety invest-
ment between large and small plants. 
First, large and small slaughter plants face different
markets. Large plants tend to supply large, homoge-
neous markets with relatively elastic demand, while
smaller plants tend to serve smaller markets with less
elastic demand. In homogeneous markets, in which a
number of firms produce and market similar or identi-
cal products, any slip in safety could reduce demand
for products from the offending plant. In less elastic
markets, products are less fungible, and buyers may be
more willing to overlook food safety slips or to work
with a plant to overcome safety problems. To protect
their markets, large plants may therefore have more
incentive than small firms to adopt food safety innova-
tions. In fact, slaughter plants that can consistently
supply high levels of product safety, as required by a
number of major food retailers, gain access to almost
guaranteed markets for large volumes of product.
Large firms may therefore have more incentive than
small firms to pursue food safety innovation. 
Another reason large firms may invest more in food
safety than small firms is that food safety lapses have
the potential to be more costly for large firms because
they may involve larger amounts of product. Large
amounts of contaminated product increase both the
probability of detection and the cost of wasted product
or recall as illustrated in the Frigoscandia case study,
though smaller lot sizing can help control the extent
and cost of contamination. For large firms, the cost of
not adopting the safety innovation may be greater than
the cost of adopting the innovation. For small firms,
the cost of not innovating may be much less and there-
fore not provide the same motivation. 
Outbreaks Spur the Demand for Safety and
Accelerate Innovation 
The 1993 outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 was a seminal
food safety event in the United States. This outbreak
led to increased consumer awareness of food safety
issues and triggered a spike in demand for food safety
that is still being felt in the industry. It is directly
responsible for the decision by fast food restaurants to
assume channel captain roles—a decision that has had
repercussions for the safety of the whole industry. 
The outbreak also pushed the Federal Government to
reassess the beef industry’s food safety standards and
to make a number of key policy changes, including
declaring E. coli O157:H7 an adulterant in raw ground
beef. The effects of this change have yet to be fully
appreciated. The outbreak also accelerated efforts to
update the Federal inspection system with PR/HACCP. 
Technological Validation is as Important as
Technological Opportunity in Driving
Innovation
The Steam Pasteurization System case study highlights
an important observation about technological innova-
tion for food safety: the design and fabrication of the
technology may be secondary to technological valida-
tion in determining the ultimate success of an innova-
tion. Not only is it difficult to measure pathogen
control and technological efficacy, but even the best
technology can be undermined by deficiencies in the
overall safety system. The actual efficacy of the tech-
nology may vary greatly from plant to plant, depend-
ing on the characteristics of each plant’s safety system.
As a result, innovators may have a difficult time certi-
fying or otherwise guaranteeing the efficacy of the
technology for controlling pathogen contamination. 
One of the largest stumbling blocks Frigoscandia
Equipment faced in the development of the Steam
Pasteurization innovation was the validation of the
technology. The long and arduous series of testing that
Frigoscandia Equipment required prior to marketing
the technology was necessary to gain market accept-
ance. Nevertheless, even this level of testing was
unable to convince all U.S. or foreign beef companies
of the dependability of the equipment in different pro-
duction environments.
Designing Regulatory Incentives for 
Food Safety Innovation
Asymmetric information in food safety markets may
result in a level of food safety investment that is less
than socially optimal. If policymakers determine that
intervention is necessary to stimulate innovation, they
then face the task of determining which policy tools to
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vey and the two case studies reveal a number of mech-
anisms developed by the beef industry to overcome
asymmetric information problems and stimulate inno-
vation. What can policymakers learn from industry
experience? Has the market evolved in such as way as
to make some policy choices more efficient than oth-
ers? This section examines those policy options sug-
gested by the theoretical and empirical evidence. 
Strengthen Appropriability Through 
Safety Information
The success of the fast food restaurants and other
channel captains in stimulating innovation reveals the
importance of the ability to verify safety and quality
claims. Channel captains require their suppliers to pro-
vide testing and/or other evidence that food safety
standards have been met. As a result, asymmetric
information problems are reduced—and food safety
innovators can more easily appropriate the benefits of
their investments. 
Likewise, reducing asymmetric information is proba-
bly an important step in any government policy
designed to stimulate food safety innovation.
Government programs that provide consumers (both
final consumers and input consumers) with food safety
information, particularly information on safe and
unsafe producers, will help the market to operate more
efficiently. With more safety information, consumers
will be able to choose the level of food safety (and
price) that best matches their preferences. As a result,
the market supply of food safety and food safety inno-
vation will better reflect consumer preferences. For
example the introduction of irradiated meat patties in
some markets has expanded the welfare of consumers
who place a high value on safety. These consumers are
able to pay a premium to purchase meat virtually guar-
anteed free of pathogens. 
With better informed consumers, it is more likely that
unsafe firms will bear some of the costs of unsafe pro-
duction, such as recall, liability, and bad publicity.
Information therefore strengthens market incentives for
firms to produce safe foods—and to invest in food
safety innovation. Information helps firms appropriate
the benefits of safety investments and helps ensure that
unsafe firms “appropriate” at least some of the costs of
safety failures. Jin and Leslie (2003) found that con-
sumer demand was sensitive to hygiene quality grades
required by Los Angeles County and posted in restau-
rant windows. Information about hygiene helped clean
restaurants benefit from their investments while restau-
rants that did not meet county standards paid the price
of their negligence in the form of fewer customers. In
addition, foodborne hospitalizations decreased after the
1998 Los Angeles County requirement.
The government has a number of tools at its disposal
to reduce asymmetric information and transform cre-
dence attributes, such as food safety, into attributes
more closely resembling search attributes that con-
sumers can evaluate by reading labels or investigating
other information sources prior to purchasing products
(Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). Labeling programs
could provide general food safety information like the
safe-handling labels on retail meat and poultry pack-
ages in the United States, or more specific information
like the “Salmonella Free” labels available to Danish
poultry producers. Government safety labeling pro-
grams could be mandatory, like nutrition labeling, or
voluntary, like some allergen labeling. 
Labeling is not the only government program targeted
at increasing food safety information and the trans-
parency of the safety system. For example, both FSIS
and the FDA post a list of recalls for contaminated,
adulterated, or misbranded products. In another pro-
gram, FSIS requires that the results of the HACCP
Salmonella testing program for meat and poultry be
published annually and made available to the public
(though, unfortunately, results are not reported for
individual firms, as was originally proposed by FSIS). 
Other government programs that could be used to pro-
vide consumers with more information about food
safety include time/temperature indicators for each
package of refrigerated food; harvest/lay/slaughter
dates on each package of an animal protein product;
pathogen performance information on each company
and its products; and a government-certified label for
low-risk foods, so companies can compete on provid-
ing safety from pathogens.
As a prerequisite to providing consumers with infor-
mation on safe and unsafe producers, the government
must generate data on safety records. In the United
States, the Federal Government and other public health
officials have taken strides in building the infrastruc-
ture for tracking the incidence and sources of food-
borne illness. The Foodborne Diseases Active
Surveillance Network (FoodNet) combines active sur-
veillance for foodborne diseases with related epidemi-
ologic studies to help public health officials better
respond to new and emerging foodborne diseases.
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Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), nine States,
the United States Department of Agriculture, and the
Food and Drug Administration. 
Another network, PulseNet, based at CDC, connects
public health laboratories in 26 States, Los Angeles
County, New York City, the FDA, and USDA to a sys-
tem of standardized testing and information sharing.
PulseNet helps reduce the time it takes disease investi-
gators to find and respond to foodborne outbreaks.
Both FoodNet and PulseNet differ from passive sur-
veillance systems that rely on reporting of foodborne
diseases by clinical laboratories to State health depart-
ments, which in turn report to CDC. Under passive
information gathering, only a fraction of foodborne ill-
nesses are routinely reported to CDC. 
In addition to improving market results, information
on safe and unsafe producers is also important for tar-
geting government enforcement activities. Unless reg-
ulators can distinguish between safe and unsafe
processors, they cannot ensure that those with poor
records pay the cost of their safety lapses. Information
is vital to government efforts to ensure that food safety
innovators appropriate the benefits of their investments
and the shirkers appropriate the costs of any failures. 
Strengthen Appropriability Through 
Increasing the Costs of Failure and the 
Benefits of Success
Not only do restaurants and other entities acting as
channel captains distinguish between safe and unsafe
producers, they provide real benefits to those who con-
sistently produce safe products. Suppliers that meet
standards benefit in terms of sales contracts and/or
price premiums, while those that fail standards lose
access to these important markets. The ERS survey
results indicate that plants with buyer specifications
had higher levels of safety activities than those with-
out. Government policies targeted at strengthening the
costs of food safety lapses and the benefits of food
safety compliance and investment may likewise stimu-
late innovation. 
Policies specifically targeted to rewarding producers of
safe products include government safety certification
and preference in government procurement programs.
Policies specifically targeted to increasing the cost of
food failures include recalls, testing schedules linked
to performance, and higher fines or longer plant clo-
sures in cases of noncompliance. Any policy that
increases the probability of getting caught selling
unsafe food also increases the probable cost of produc-
ing unsafe food. 
A potential drawback to any policy targeted to
strengthening appropriability is the possibility that
imitation and the diffusion of new technologies will be
slowed. When innovating firms have strong appropri-
ability mechanisms, the costs of imitation rise, reduc-
ing the rate of diffusion. In the case of food safety, the
stimulating effect of strengthened appropriability on
social welfare may outweigh the dampening effect of
lowered diffusion. 
Provide Flexibility in Choice of 
Food Safety Technology
Regulation that does not dictate any particular technol-
ogy is likely to encourage efficiency and innovation.
When government safety standards focus on perform-
ance, not process, individual firms can choose the
most efficient approach to achieve a particular stan-
dard. For some firms, capital-intensive activities will
be more efficient than labor-intensive activities; for
other firms, the opposite will be true. Performance
standards encourage efficiency by letting firms use
whatever approach is best for their particular produc-
tion process. 
Performance standards encourage innovation by giving
firms the freedom to develop new approaches to achieve
outcome targets. Past regulations have often prescribed
particular remediation technologies. For example, in
pollution control, the government has specified “best
available technology” and “best available control tech-
nology,” while food safety regulation has focused on the
prescription of Good Manufacturing Practices. The
specification of process is deeply rooted in U.S. practice
and implies that one technology is best, which discour-
ages innovation. As Porter and Linde (1995) note, the
government should maximize the opportunity for inno-
vation by letting industries discover how to solve their
own problems. 
The Steam Pasteurization System case study directly
illustrates the power of a flexible regulatory approach
for stimulating innovation. PR/HACCP provides food
processors with flexibility to innovate and adopt new
safety technologies as critical control point measures
in a plant’s PR/HACCP system. If PR/HACCP had
specified particular technologies for each critical con-
trol point, the drive for more efficient control point
measures would have been severely dampened and
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tive to develop the Steam Pasteurization System. 
The variety of food safety activities listed in the ERS
survey results provides more evidence of the role of
regulator flexibility in stimulating innovation and effi-
ciency. If PR/HACCP had specified particular tech-
nologies for each critical control point, then the variety
of safety activities would likely have been restricted
and large and small firms would have had more diffi-
culty finding an efficient mix of capital- and labor-
intensive activities. 
Invest in the Scientific Infrastructure and
Support Research on Safety Testing 
The ERS survey and the two case studies did not high-
light any food safety innovations that directly depended
on government research and development or on govern-
ment expertise. This does not mean that government-
supported institutional infrastructure, such as
intellectual property rights protection, was not important
to the development of the innovations highlighted in the
empirical investigation (patent rights were critical in
enabling the invention of the Steam Pasteurization
System technology). Nor does it mean that basic gov-
ernment-funded research did not contribute indirectly to
the development of these innovations. By expanding the
general pool of knowledge about pathogen testing and
food processing, government researchers helped build
the infrastructure for both the Steam Pasteurization
System technology and the Bacterial Pathogen
Sampling and Testing Program. 
Fuglie et al. (1996) contend that government research
and development plays an important role in food
safety innovation: They note:
The private sector often underinvests in agri-
cultural research because only a share of the
total economic benefits can be captured. This
is most true of fundamental (pre-technology)
research and is also true for applied research
that generates important non-market benefits,
such as environmental, social science, food
safety, and nutrition research. (p. 33) 
Government can also play a role in building collabora-
tions—something that the case studies showed to be
important to successful innovation. Governments
encourage collaborations through a number of vehi-
cles, including cooperative funding agreements, out-
reach programs, and tax-free research areas. In the
United States, the Federal Technology Transfer Act of
1986 and the National Cooperative Research and
Production Act of 1993 (National Science Board,
2002) bolster collaborative research efforts. 
The Frigoscandia Equipment case study suggests a
more direct sort of technical research support that could
be provided by government research: validated testing
methodologies or certification for pathogen control
technologies. To successfully commercialize the Steam
Pasteurization System technology, Frigoscandia
Equipment needed to establish the efficacy of the tech-
nology. However, as with many pathogen reduction
technologies, success was not easy to prove, particularly
given the wide range of production technologies in dif-
ferent slaughter plants. When standards are technically
difficult to verify, government services may be instru-
mental in helping to establish testing norms. For exam-
ple, the Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards
Administration has established a reference laboratory to
evaluate and verify the validity of analytical techniques
applied to the detection of genetically enhanced traits in
grains and grain products (for more information, see
http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/newsroom/backgrounders/
b-reference-lab.htm).
Another important function for government research
and development may be to improve food safety 
monitoring capabilities. Advances in technology are
key to supporting, and in many cases, stimulating
information provision. For example, “DNA finger-
printing” technology makes it easier to link illness to
specific firms. Such information may be key in health
investigations of outbreaks and in food safety litigation
(Buzby et al., 2001). 
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